DETENTION OPERATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS: 
FOUR CHALLENGES FOR THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
AND OTHER EXISTING LAW 

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In September 2010, President Jakob Kellenberger of the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) summarized the conclusions of a two-year, internal ICRC study of changes that have occurred in the nature of armed conflict since the signing of the Geneva Conventions in 1949,1 and he also suggested how international humanitarian law (IHL) should respond to those changes. 2 In a previous address marking the sixtieth anniversary of the Geneva Conventions, Kellenberger had observed that in the place of traditional conflicts between state-sponsored armies on a battlefield, modern conflicts frequently involve nonstate actors, such as terrorist groups—a development that has blurred the line between civilians and combatants, and created challenges for IHL.3 The ICRC study concluded that IHL generally provides a suitable legal framework for regulating armed conflict. Kellenberger explained, “What is required in most cases—to improve the situation of persons affected by armed conflict—is greater compliance with the existing legal framework, not the adoption of new rules.” Nonetheless, Kellenberger said that the ICRC study found numerous “gaps or weaknesses in the existing legal framework, which requires further development or clarification.” One area that he specifically identified for future legal development was detention of persons in noninternational armed

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conflict, where he identified “an urgent need to explore new legal ways for dealing exhaustively” with the subject.4

Kellenberger’s remarks reflect a growing recognition among government and international organization officials5 and among IHL experts6 that the black-letter rules of the venerable Geneva Conventions often do not provide clear guidance for states engaged in conflicts with nonstate actors. As the ICRC study concluded, one particular subset of problems arises from the detention by states of members of nonstate groups who pose a threat to the state and its people.7 The traditional international armed conflict paradigm, featuring prisoners of war detained until the end of hostilities, breaks down in a conflict of indefinite, and potentially unending, duration, with actors not entitled to combatant status under international law. Likewise, the criminal law model developed for peacetime arrests of those within a state’s jurisdiction is typically unavailable or, at best, impractical for detaining nonstate actors that military or intelligence personnel pick up outside a state’s borders. In these circumstances, a state is left without clear, comprehensive international rules to govern its detention operations.8

This article focuses on four questions, left open by the Geneva Conventions, regarding detention operations in such conflicts:

● Which individuals are subject to detention?
● What legal process must the state provide to those detained?
● When does the state’s right to detain terminate?
● What legal obligations do states have in connection with repatriating detainees at the end of detention?

While these questions are not the only ones surrounding conflicts with nonstate actors that require legal resolution, they are the questions that were the most difficult questions in our service in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State.9 During our respective

4 Kellenberger, supra note 2.
5 See, e.g., FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM., VISIT TO GUANTÁNAMO BAY, 2006—07, H.C. 44, at 3 (UK) (concluding that Geneva Conventions “lack clarity and are out of date” and require updating to “deal[] more satisfactorily with asymmetric warfare, with international terrorism, with the status of irregular combatants”); ANNE-MARIE LIZIN, REPORT ON GUANTÁNAMO BAY (OSCE Parliamentary Assembly) 13 (June 30, 2006) (describing “legal haziness” surrounding application of Geneva Conventions to members of Al Qaeda).
7 Kellenberger, supra note 2 (concluding that the “dearth of legal norms applicable in non-international armed conflicts” is a significant obstacle to “safeguarding the life, health and dignity of those who have been detained”).
8 This need for legal development is not surprising. See W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AJIL 82, 82 (2003) (explaining that “deliberative and measured” nature of the law means that it lags behind changing facts).
9 The question of which individuals may be detained is closely related to the issue of which individuals may be targeted for attack. In an effort to shed light on this matter, the ICRC recently completed a seven-year expert process to produce interpretive guidance on when civilians are “directly participating in hostilities.” INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009). Many participating experts disagreed with the ICRC on how to apply the concept to important groups and to individual functions in conflicts with nonstate actors—with the consequence that the ICRC was compelled to issue the guidance without the list of participating experts. See Michael
tenures at the State Department, we responded regularly to concerns raised by foreign governments, nongovernmental and international organizations, scholars, and the media that U.S. policies on these matters, as implemented by the Bush administration after the 9/11 attacks, violated international law. Our efforts to identify a consensus view on the applicable international legal standards were undercut, however, by strongly conflicting assertions of these standards by international legal experts. We found it frustrating that international law had yet to develop clear legal rules that could guide policymakers, like those at the State Department, who wish to follow international law in combating groups like Al Qaeda.

In 2007, the Office of the Legal Adviser initiated a series of meetings with several states that have engaged in counterterrorism and detention operations. The goal was to identify applicable international legal rules as well as the areas where further legal development is needed. These meetings were conducted in parallel with other international efforts to develop relevant international law. Denmark convened the “Copenhagen Process” in response to concerns that Danish troops were involved in a range of situations involving the potential detention of non-state enemy fighters without sufficient guidance on applicable rules. The goal was “to establish a common framework for all troop-contributing States” on detention questions in UN-approved multilateral operations. Issues considered included standards for detainee transfers and differences in detention rules between international, noninternational, and peacetime settings. These governmental efforts built upon the work of numerous legal scholars and nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, among others—work that has generated a plethora of proposals for developing legal standards in this area.

These various efforts at developing new law have been hampered in various ways, two of which merit special attention. First, many governments and nongovernmental organizations insist that existing rules are adequate and that the problem, if any, is that states fail to
adhere to those rules.\textsuperscript{15} This insistence that existing rules provide adequate guidance regarding contemporary conflicts is understandable;\textsuperscript{16} since those rules have served a critical role in restraining the behavior of states in the situations for which they were designed, care must be taken to avoid weakening the overall framework of which they are a part.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, there is a real risk that states and nonstate actors will abuse holes in the law when they are identified as such. During the time that we served in government, we believe the United States erred by straining to take advantage of gaps in international law in order to avoid applying important protections for detainees as elements of its post-9/11 detention policy.\textsuperscript{18} Nevertheless, the failure by other observers to acknowledge the limitations of existing law hampers efforts to develop new law. Pretending that clear detention rules already exist to guide state practice does not serve the cause of international humanitarian or human rights law.

Second, those that do agree that existing legal rules are not clear and exhaustive cannot agree on how the law should be developed. Some scholars and the ICRC have argued that the rules for international armed conflicts should be applied in noninternational armed conflicts. Other scholars and human rights groups have advocated the use of national laws, guided by human rights law, to fill existing gaps. Neither of these approaches works, however, because the questions that we have raised are answered in an inadequate or conflicting manner in those bodies of law. As a consequence, as the ICRC study acknowledged, states engaged in conflicts with nonstate actors lack sufficient guidance from international law as to how to make difficult choices in detention policy.\textsuperscript{19}

The first goal of this article is to clarify the existing state of the law in order to lay a foundation from which states can develop clear rules to answer the four questions discussed here.\textsuperscript{20} Our rules, not bending them, is essential to our credibility and hence to our effectiveness in the fight against terrorism.

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\textsuperscript{14} The insistence that implementation is the critical issue in IHL is a point that has been made for many years. See, e.g., MERMONT, supra note 3, at 589 (describing inherent resistance to changes in legal arrangements even in the face of drastically changed factual realities).

\textsuperscript{15} EMINENT JURISTS PANEL ON TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, ASSESSING DAMAGE, URGING ACTION 20 (2009), available at http://epic.org/IMG/EJP-Report.pdf (‘‘Human rights law provides sufficient flexibility for States to adjust to security needs; States should rely upon this framework rather than seek to re-write the rule book.’’); see also KELLENBERGER, supra note 2.

\textsuperscript{16} See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 52 (1990) (‘‘Rules which are perceived to have a high degree of determinacy—that is, readily ascertainable normative content—would seem to have a better chance of actually regulating conduct in the real world than those which are less determinate.’’).
methodology is to look first at the treaty provisions applicable in noninternational armed conflict and demonstrate where they do not provide adequate guidance to the questions posed. We then look to IHL (for international armed conflict), municipal law, and international human rights law as potential sources of applicable law. We establish that these additional sources themselves contain gaps and ambiguities that raise doubts as to whether simply applying those bodies of law would answer our questions. The context in which the rules were developed impedes their direct application to armed conflicts with nonstate actors.

The second task for this article is to identify options and to develop convergences on each of the four questions—which may, in turn, help us begin formulating answers to them. Our goal is not to propose fixes that “contemplate[] the detention of more people, in more circumstances, and with fewer procedural protections than under current international law.”

Rather, our hope is that by identifying areas of agreement among states detaining nonstate fighters, and by suggesting additional considerations that should receive further thought, the international community will be better positioned to develop new law for guiding and constraining state action in future conflicts. While we recognize that a new international instrument, even if advisable, is unlikely to be achieved in the near future, an agreement on common principles by like-minded states would further the process of legal development—which is urgently needed in this area.

I. The Problem Elaborated

It is not an accident that the Geneva Conventions do not provide a full set of legal rules governing conflicts between states and nonstate actors. Those Conventions were drafted with armed conflicts between states as the primary focus. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, which is the jurisdictional provision for the bulk of the Conventions’ protections, limits application of the Conventions to conflicts between high contracting parties, which are limited to states.

Thus, the Geneva Conventions generally provide regulations governing armed conflicts between nation-states. Only common Article 3 and Additional Protocols I and II apply, as a matter of treaty law, to at least some conflicts involving nonstate groups. Those treaty provisions provide important protections owed to those detained in some conflicts with nonstate actors.


22 See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 1, Art. 2 (“[T]he present convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties . . . .”).

23 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].


25 The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocols also apply to noninternational armed conflict. See Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Art. 1, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 UNTS 137, 19 ILM 1524 (“This Convention and its annexed Protocols shall also apply . . . to situations referred to in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.”) The prohibitions on weapons in these treaties do not address the detention questions that are the subject of this article.
Common Article 3 applies as a matter of customary international law to all conflicts. The article prohibits murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, torture, and outrages upon personal dignity, including humiliating and degrading treatment of persons not taking active part in hostilities. It also requires that those detained may not be criminally sentenced or executed “without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”

Additional Protocol II applies only to conflicts that “take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.” When applicable, the Protocol builds upon common Article 3 by elaborating upon the treatment protections owed those who are detained and by adding specific protections that combatants owe the civilian population in noninternational armed conflicts.

Additional Protocol I is, for the most part, limited in its application to international armed conflicts. Article 1(4), however, extends Protocol I’s protections to conflicts in “which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination,” meaning that it will be applicable in some conflicts with nonstate groups. Article 96(3) of Protocol I even allows nonstate groups engaged in these kinds of conflicts the opportunity to assume responsibilities through unilateral declaration, thereby bringing the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I into effect for the conflicts. In addition to restricting the means and methods of warfare that may be employed in these conflicts, Additional Protocol I protects civilians and civilian objects and, most importantly for our purposes, establishes rules regarding the treatment of captured fighters. The most important of these treatment protections is Article 75, which provides protection from torture, outrages upon personal dignity, and collective punishments, as well as various procedural protections that must be provided before imposing criminal punishment. Many states, organizations, and scholars believe that Article 75 is custom in both international and national law.

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26 See Michael J. Matheson, Continuity and Change in the Law of War: 1975–2005: Detainees and POWs, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 543, 547–48 (2006) (describing depth and breadth of this view). The U.S. Supreme Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra note 18, at 629–30, that common Article 3 applied as a matter of treaty law to the U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda. There is some question regarding whether this treaty interpretation is correct, given that the text of common Article 3 limits application to conflicts “occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” See INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, GENEVA CONVENTION [III] RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR: COMMENTARY 37 (Jean S. Pictet gen. ed., 1960) (interpreting the term “one” to mean “within the confines of a single country”) [hereinafter THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION COMMENTARY]. It is also in conflict with the interpretation of “international armed conflict” made by other municipal courts. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, para. 21 [2006], at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html (“Confronting the dangers of terrorism constitutes a part of the international law dealing with armed conflicts of international character.”).

27 See Additional Protocol II, supra note 24, Art. 1. Additional Protocol II is potentially applicable to the government of Afghanistan’s noninternational armed conflict with the Taliban because the Taliban exercises control over a portion of Afghan territory from which it conducts sustained and continuous military operations against the government. However, a conflict with a group like Al Qaeda is unlikely to fall within the ambit of Additional Protocol II because Al Qaeda does not control territory.

28 Although the United States signed Additional Protocol II, and President Reagan transmitted it to the Senate in 1987, it has not been approved by the Senate. The White House recently called upon the Senate to provide its advice and consent to Additional Protocol II. White House Fact Sheet, New Actions on Guantánamo and Detainee Policy (Mar. 7, 2011), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-sheet-new-actions-guantanamo-and-detainee-policy.
noninternational armed conflicts. The Obama administration announced in March 2011 that the United States would apply Article 75 out of a “sense of legal obligation” in international armed conflicts, but the administration neither stated that Article 75 is customary international law nor agreed to apply Article 75 in noninternational armed conflicts, such as the conflict with Al Qaeda. While this announcement is a good first step, we believe that the United States and other countries should apply Article 75 as a legal obligation in all conflicts.

Together, common Article 3, Additional Protocol II, and Article 75 provide important treatment protections in conflicts between states and nonstate actors. We believe that the United States should have provided all detainees in the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban the protections of common Article 3 and Article 75 from the outset of the conflict. Had the United States applied those established international rules, it might have prevented cases of detainee mistreatment and blunted the charge that it had placed detainees into a “legal black


30 White House Fact Sheet, supra note 28. During the Reagan administration, the Department of Defense Law of War Working Group concluded that Article 75 was already part of customary international law in international armed conflicts. Memorandum from the Law of War Working Group to the Assistant General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense (May 9, 1986), cited in Matheson, supra note 26, at 546. The Legal Adviser’s Office of the State Department agreed with that conclusion, and Deputy Legal Adviser Michael Matheson announced on behalf of the administration in 1987 that the fundamental guarantees contained in Article 75 were among those parts of Additional Protocol I that the United States believed “should be observed and in due course recognized as customary law.” Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419, 422 (1987).

Two decades later, Matheson argued that the provisions of Article 75 had, by then, come “to be widely accepted as part of customary law applicable in all armed conflicts.” Matheson, supra note 26, at 547. In its decision in Hamdan, supra note 18, at 633, a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court also concluded that the trial protections set forth in Article 75 are customary international law.

Nevertheless, after many years of review and urging by the Office of the Legal Adviser, the Bush administration was unable to arrive at an agreed position confirming the status of Article 75 as customary international law, or agreeing to apply it as a legal obligation in either international or noninternational armed conflicts. See John B. Bellinger III, For Obama, Vexing Detainee Decisions Loom (Apr. 14, 2010), at http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/obama- vouchers-detainee-decisions-loom/p21895 (explaining that eight years of review by both the Bush and Obama administrations have yet to produce an executive branch position on this issue); Julian E. Barnes, Internal Critics Seek a Softer Line; Bush Administration Moderates Push to Change Detention and Interrogation Policies Before Their Time’s Up, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008, at A20 (noting disagreements within Bush administration on Article 75’s status as customary law). Difficulty in establishing general and consistent state practice required to arrive at the determination of customary law was a primary stumbling block. It appears these same difficulties explain why the Obama administration has not explicitly stated that Article 75 is customary international law. See John B. Bellinger III, Obama, Bush and the Geneva Conventions (Aug. 11, 2010), at http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/08/11/obama_bush_and_the_geneva_conventions (noting failure of Obama administration to commit to following Article 75 as a matter of law in conflict with Al Qaeda).

31 This is not to say that all of the treatment protections provided even by these instruments are models of clarity. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was unwilling to permit criminal prosecutions to proceed for violations of the prohibition on “violence to life and person,” because the term was insufficiently precise to support prosecution under international law. Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-32-T, paras. 193–204 (Nov. 29, 2002); see also H.M.G. CABINET OFFICE, supra note 11 (noting lack of consensus on what constitutes “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment”). Nevertheless, the United States’ decision to fully implement common Article 3 after the Supreme Court decision in Hamdan suggests that implementation was possible.
hole.” And although those rules do not address the particular detention questions raised here, earlier U.S. acceptance of its treatment obligations under international rules might have led members of the international community to be more willing to acknowledge areas in which detention rules need further elaboration.

The limited treaty law governing noninternational armed conflict has led many governments, international organizations, and scholars to suggest that some or all of the rules from international armed conflicts should be applied in noninternational armed conflict. During the drafting of the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC proposed applying the entire body of protections to noninternational armed conflict, but the idea was rejected by states. Some present-day scholars advocate the same idea, in essence seeking to supersede the states’ decision at the Geneva Conference to treat international and noninternational armed conflict differently.

The ICRC and other experts, while accepting that the Geneva Conventions recognize a difference between international and noninternational armed conflict, have concluded that nearly all of those Conventions, as well as Additional Protocol I, have achieved the status of customary law applicable in noninternational armed conflict. The conclusion that many or all rules applicable to international armed conflict are customary international law in noninternational armed conflict is suspect, however, given the paucity of state practice and opinio juris to establish this proposition. But even if the entirety of the Third and Fourth Geneva

32 Lord Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 27th F. A. Mann Lecture (Nov. 25, 2003), at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/nov/guantanamo.pdf. Both President Obama and his 2008 Republican opponent Senator John McCain agree with the assessment that fealty to IHL treatment protections would have been beneficial to the United States. See Interview by Bob Schieffer with Senator John McCain (Aug. 30, 2009), at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/30/mccain-whacks-cheney-tort_n_272179.html (arguing that detainee interrogations during the Bush administration were conducted inconsistently with the Geneva Conventions, resulting in a propaganda benefit for Al Qaeda and in harm to U.S. relations with its allies); Barack Obama, Protecting Our Security and Our Values, Address at the National Archives (May 21, 2009) (explaining decision to ban enhanced interrogation techniques because they undermined the rule of law, aided Al Qaeda recruitment, and put U.S. military personnel at risk of similar mistreatment).

33 THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 60.


35 The International Court of Justice has affirmed the status of the Geneva Conventions as customary international law in conflicts between states. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ REP. 226, 257 (July 8) (“[T]hese fundamental rules are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law.”); see also Oscar Schachter, Entangled Treaty and Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 717, 718 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989) (“[C]ommentators have observed an increasing tendency on the part of governments and lawyers to consider the rules in international agreements as customary law on one ground or another, and therefore binding on States not parties to the agreement.”).

36 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 29 (concluding that 136 of 161 rules constituted customary law in both international and noninternational armed conflict); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653, 2654 n.4 (2004–05) (claiming “core principles of [the law of armed conflict] apply across the spectrum of conflict types”); Stewart, supra note 34, at 321–22 (summarizing literature supporting international armed conflict rules as customary international law applicable in noninternational armed conflicts).

Conventions were to apply to conflicts with nonstate actors, the four questions we presented above would remain unanswered. In some instances the Conventions fail to address the questions at all; in others, they provide answers designed for international armed conflicts that are difficult to apply to conflicts with nonstate actors.

The difficulty in applying the rules of international armed conflict to noninternational armed conflict is not surprising, given the differences between these types of wars. International armed conflicts are conflicts between states in which it is relatively easy to distinguish between combatants and civilians, with different substantive detention standards and processes assigned to each group. These conflicts also hold out the prospect of a definite end of hostilities, followed by an organized repatriation of enemy soldiers and civilians. By contrast, in conflicts involving nonstate actors, the distinction between civilians and combatants is uncertain and blurred, thereby making detention rules based on status difficult to apply—mandating more robust review procedures to ensure that the correct person is detained. These conflicts are indefinite in length, potentially with no identifiable point of closure—which requires a reconceptualization of the end of hostilities. And they involve fighters from many countries, many of whom may commit serious human rights violations, making repatriation much more difficult. These differences explain why the rules of international armed conflict do not address the full range of detention issues in conflicts with nonstate actors.

Other writers argue that conflicts with nonstate actors are governed by national laws, which are themselves regulated by international human rights law. Some base this view on a reluctance to accept that conflicts with nonstate actors can amount to war governed by IHL. This particular position is incorrect, however, as it is clear that some conflicts with nonstate actors rise to the level of armed conflicts, in which IHL is applicable. But even given that IHL regulates some conflicts on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT–94–1–AR72, para. 126 (Oct. 2, 1995) (holding that rules from international armed conflict have not made a "full and mechanical transplant" to noninternational armed conflict); Iain Scobbie, The Approach to Customary International Law in the Study, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 15, 30 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007) ("There appears to be too easy an elision from the fact of widespread participation in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols to the normative conclusion of customary status.").


41 See Alain Pellet, No, This Is Not War! (Oct. 3, 2001), at https://www.unodc.org/tldb/bibliography/Biblio_International_Law_Pellet_2001.doc (arguing 9/11 attacks were not an act of war, because they did not emanate from a state actor).

42 See Tadić, supra note 37, para. 70 (holding armed conflict exists “whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State”); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra note 18, at 630–31 (holding that conflict
with nonstate actors, the complementary nature of different bodies of international law suggests that human rights law also contributes to regulation of these conflicts.

Nevertheless, determining how to apply human rights law is difficult because the relationship between human rights law and IHL is complex. In the Wall case the International Court of Justice (ICJ) set forth its view on the relationship between the two, finding three possible situations: “some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law.” But the ICJ has provided limited guidance on how a state should determine which of these three situations applies.

Lex specialis and complementarity provide a partial methodology for reconciling IHL and human rights law. The principle of lex specialis provides that in the event of conflict, the more specific rule applicable in a particular situation should be applied—which would usually be the IHL rule in armed conflict situations. Thus, the ICJ explained in the Nuclear Weapons case that, while the human rights-based protection against arbitrary deprivation of life continued to apply during armed conflict, the more specific IHL rule determined its content. Lex specialis must be applied with the complementary nature of international legal obligations in mind: human rights law should be read in light of relevant IHL, and vice versa.

Lex specialis and complementarity do not, however, fully reconcile these competing bodies of law. Complementarity is helpful only when the purposes of IHL and human rights law are the same. When the rules offered by both bodies of law are in conflict, or when one body of law has deliberately left discretion to states, a methodology is needed to prioritize between the rules, and specificity is not always sufficient for that purpose. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires judicial review of the legality of security detention, whereas the Fourth Geneva Convention specifically allows for administrative review. Since the two bodies of law have different presumptions about the context of detention, they have different, specific, but contradictory rules as to who must perform the required review. Thus, determining which set of rules applies requires a framework other than complementarity or lex specialis—a framework that needs to be developed.

between the United States and Al Qaeda is a “conflict not of an international character” to which common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies.

43 A vibrant literature theorizes on how human rights law and IHL should interact. See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. STUD. (forthcoming) (arguing human rights law can play gap-filling role in parts of IHL dealing with peacetime activities, such as detention, but not with rules related to actual combat); Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 ISR. L. REV. 310, 312 (2007) (arguing complementarity and specificity guide determination of when to apply which body of law); Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AJIL 239 (2000) (tracing the history of relationship between these two bodies of law).

44 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ REP. 136, para. 106 (July 9).

45 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 35, at 240 (“The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict . . . .”).

46 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31, para. (3)(c), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (“There shall be taken into account, together with the context: . . . a[ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”).


48 Art. 9(3), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 UNTS 171.
 Moreover, the peacetime foundation of human rights law makes it difficult to apply wholesale to conflicts with nonstate actors. Because of this peacetime premise, human rights law presumes criminal detention is the primary route to incapacitation of threats. Many human rights actors have used this preference to argue that a state should be able to detain only those members of nonstate groups whom it criminally prosecutes. Such an approach is not mandated, however, by all human rights regimes. Some human rights instruments permit states to use preventive detention to mitigate threats to society. Legal scholars and human rights bodies, including the UN Human Rights Committee, have recognized that states may administratively detain individuals for security purposes in some circumstances, if given procedural

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49 One point of some dispute is whether human rights obligations extend extraterritorially. The United States has long rejected the view that the ICCPR applies to extraterritorial actions by state agents. The plain words of ICCPR Article 2(1) limit its application to “all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.” The United States, for many years and across administrations, has interpreted this provision as limiting the scope of application of the ICCPR to individuals who are both in state territory and subject to its jurisdiction. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UN COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, annex 1 (Oct. 21, 2005), at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/55504.htm. The U.S. position relies not only on the text of Article 2, but also on its negotiating history, which appears to support the U.S. position.

The ICCPR Human Rights Committee, by contrast, has written that the “and” in Article 2 actually means “or.” UN Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, para. 10, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) (“[A] State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.”) Such an interpretation would mean that the Covenant protects individuals who are within the State’s territory and also those who are subject to its jurisdiction. In his commentary on the Covenant, Manfred Nowak explains that this interpretation “correct[s] the wording of this provision” by bringing it closer to the object and purpose of the treaty. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 43–44 (2d rev. ed. 2005).

Unlike the ICCPR, the European Convention on Human Rights contains no textual territorial limitation to application. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 5, 213 UNTS 221 (“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”). The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted this provision to mean that the Convention’s protections extend to those under the “effective control” of a state party to the treaty. See Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, para. 70 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 12, 2001), 41 ILM 517 (“[T]he responsibility of a Contracting Party was capable of being engaged when as a consequence of military action . . . it exercised effective control of an area outside its national territory.”).

The American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 [hereinafter American Convention], similarly has no express territorial limitations on its application. Article 1 provides: “The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms . . . .”

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has interpreted the American Convention to apply extraterritorially in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, para. 37 (1999) (holding Convention may extend “to conduct with an extraterritorial locus where the person concerned is present in the territory of one state, but subject to the control of another state—usually through the acts of the latter’s agents abroad”).

50 See Michael Ratner, Letter to the Editor, A New Court for Terror Suspects?, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007, at A15 (“No domestic or international law permits preventive detention under the current circumstances.”); Rona, supra note 40, at 148 (arguing absence of detailed IHL detention provisions in noninternational armed conflict means that criminal trial must be used prior to detention).

51 Preventive detention has been approved in some instances by human rights bodies outside the security context at issue here. For example, the Human Rights Committee rejected a complaint against a New Zealand law permitting preventive detention of sexual predators. See UN Human Rights Comm., Rameka v. New Zealand, Communication No. 1090/2002, para. 7.3, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/D/1090/2002 (Nov. 6, 2003) (allowing preventive detention provided periodic review requirement was met). By contrast, the Committee was critical of a French law permitting preventive detention of sex offenders for one-year periods after the completion of their criminal detention based on a finding of continued dangerousness. See UN Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations, France, para. 16, UN Doc.
protections. Even the European Convention on Human Rights, which generally has been interpreted as prohibiting administrative detention for security purposes, allows it when the requirements for derogation from the Convention are met.

If criminal prosecution were legally required for detention of nonstate actors, numerous practical difficulties would ensue. Criminal convictions require the state to possess admissible evidence that establishes that an individual violated an existing law, and that satisfies a high standard of proof, such as beyond a reasonable doubt. These evidentiary problems often doom prosecutions. States may capture nonstate fighters on or adjacent to the battlefield in circumstances where evidence collection either cannot occur or cannot be a priority. Sources of evidence may also include intelligence sources that cannot be subjected to the rigors of confrontation without compromising sources and methods.

Even when the state does have admissible evidence, actions taken outside the prosecuting state may not violate the law of the other state, given the limits on extraterritorial application of criminal law. Bringing nonstate fighters back for prosecution before national courts also presents practical difficulties. Should the United States take Taliban fighters picked up in Afghanistan to the United States for prosecution? Would witnesses be available to testify so far from where any crimes were committed? And what about the resources that would be needed to conduct thousands, or even tens of thousands, of trials? These difficulties, which are central to the decision in IHL to de-link incapacitation and criminal prosecution, all apply to conflicts with nonstate actors.

Requiring criminal trials to justify detention in noninternational armed conflict is also legally problematic. Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II specifically contemplate security detention separate from criminal prosecution. Reading human rights law to prohibit noncriminal detention would be inconsistent with applying the most specific applicable legal rules (lex specialis) and would fail to read international legal obligations in light of one another (complementarity).

But these arguments in favor of noncriminal detention in conflicts with nonstate actors do not alter the reality that few provisions of human rights law regulate preventive detention. The

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52 See UN Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 8, Art. 9, para. 4 (1992), UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994) (“if so-called preventive detention is used, for reasons of public security, it must be controlled by these same provisions, i.e. it must not be arbitrary”).

53 Supra note 49.


55 See Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 48 (1961) (upholding Irish law allowing for security detention without trial based on proper invocation of European Convention on Human Rights Article 15 derogation from Article 5). Article 15 allows for derogation “in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation.” It is doubtful that all conflicts with nonstate actors that are the subject of this article would meet this standard.


absence of much treaty law in the area results in a lack of uniformity in state practice, which makes it difficult to locate many customary human rights norms governing preventive detention. The few restrictions that do exist are often subject to derogation, allowing states to avoid restrictions on preventive detention imposed by human rights treaties during the very detention situations that we are addressing in this article.

Together, these limitations of existing IHL, human rights law, and domestic criminal law explain in general terms why our four questions are inadequately addressed. We now turn to each of the questions to examine the specific uncertainties associated with each and to offer our suggestions as to how the law should develop.

II. SCOPE OF DETENTION AUTHORITY: WHO MAY BE DETAINED?

The first question to be addressed is which individuals are subject to detention in a conflict with a nonstate actor. One of the most common complaints that we heard in the State Department was that the United States employed an overbroad definition of who was subject to detention in its conflict with Al Qaeda. These complaints were fueled by unreasonable assertions regarding the scope of detention authority. Underlying this debate is the need for greater clarity in determining who is subject to detention in conflicts with nonstate actors. It is clear that an individual who is caught with a weapon on the battlefield or who is about to plant an improvised explosive device is subject to detention. But what about those who smuggled in the weapons used by the insurgent groups? Or the financier whose funds facilitated the purchase of weapons? Or even a religious leader whose fiery sermon incited the attacks?

In general terms, the IHL principle of military necessity allows a state to use “measures not prohibited by international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.” This principle gives states the authority to detain enemy fighters when necessary to achieve their military objective, but it is limited by restrictions on
detention authority designed to protect humanitarian interests. The challenge in conflicts with nonstate actors is to identify the humanitarian limits on military necessity that cabin the state’s detention authority.

Such limits cannot be found in the instruments governing noninternational armed conflict. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, and Additional Protocol II all contemplate that states will undertake detention operations in noninternational armed conflict, but provide no guidance as to who may be detained. They only provide restrictions on how those who are detained are treated. This gap in the law leaves states searching for additional sources of law to guide the exercise of detention authority.

Many scholars and international and nongovernmental organizations have argued that as a matter of either law or policy, rules developed in international armed conflict should restrict detention in noninternational armed conflict. But the Geneva Conventions are premised on a world in which combatants generally qualify for prisoner-of-war status and in which civilians do not regularly engage in hostilities. Neither of these assumptions is true in conflicts with non-state actors—which suggests the limited value of importing international armed conflict rules here.

Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention specifies the criteria for categorizing enemy fighters as prisoners of war: they are generally the members of armed forces of a party to the conflict or members of other militias who have been captured and who meet four additional criteria: (1) being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, (2) wearing distinctive signs or uniforms, (3) carrying arms openly, and (4) conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Article 44 of Additional Protocol I expands

RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 1988) (“Military necessity . . . allows of the capturing of every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of peculiar danger to the captor . . . .”).


64 One clear restraint on military necessity is the Martens Clause. See Hague Convention (II) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, pmbl., July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803: Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to concretize application of this general provision to detention operations in conflicts with nonstate actors.

65 For a discussion of the substantive scope of detention authority and its importance in balancing liberty and security, see Waxman, supra note 56.

66 See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. Even if the international armed conflict detention rules are not legally applicable, they may be useful by analogy or as representing the potentially most stringent restrictions on detention in noninternational armed conflict. See Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 AJIL 48, 49–51 (2009) (explaining that when detention is allowed in international armed conflict, it must a fortiori be permitted in noninternational armed conflict).

67 Article 4 has itself engendered vigorous legal debate regarding whether members of regular armed forces must meet the four criteria of Article 4(A)(2) to qualify for prisoner-of-war status. Compare Sean D. Murphy, Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the “War on Terrorism”: Applying the Core Rules to the Release of Persons Deemed “Unprivileged Combatants,” 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1125–26 (2007) (arguing that armed forces are not “regular” unless they meet the four criteria), with Evan J. Wallach, Afghanistan, Quirin and Uchiyama: Does the Sauce Suit the Gander?, 2003 ARMY LAW., Nov. 2003, at 18, 24 (contending that four criteria are applicable only to “militia or volunteer corps,” not to regular state troops).
the prisoner-of-war protections by granting status to combatants who generally do not distinguish themselves from the general population, provided that they carry arms openly while visible to the enemy during preparation for an attack and during an actual military engagement. Based on their categorization as combatants, prisoners of war may be detained until the cessation of active hostilities, with the treatment protections provided by the Conventions.68

Most nonstate armed groups fail to satisfy the requirements for prisoner-of-war status, even under the relaxed standards of Additional Protocol I. Terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, for example, do not carry their arms openly, whether during actual combat operations or otherwise.69 They also use perfidious attacks on civilians as a means of warfare, thus systematically violating the laws and customs of war. Because nonstate fighters do not fit within the prisoner-of-war category, the Third Geneva Convention provides no guidance on the scope of detention authority.70

Some scholars71 and courts72 urge that if nonstate fighters do not qualify as prisoners of war, they must be treated as civilian protected persons subject to protection by the Fourth Geneva Convention. Article 4 defines “protected persons” as those “who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power.” Protected persons may be detained only on the basis of individualized determinations that the security of the detaining power makes detention absolutely necessary, and detention must cease when the need ends.73 Those supporting the

70 Some observers have urged that, as a matter of policy, detained members of Al Qaeda should be provided prisoner-of-war privileges. See Brett Shumate, New Rules for a New War: The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to Al-Qaeda and Taliban Detainees Captured in Afghanistan, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV., Summer 2005, at 1, 47–52 (summarizing support for this position). We do not understand those who support granting prisoner-of-war privileges to detainees in conflicts with nonstate actors as saying that anyone may be detained under the laws of war provided that the state grants prisoner-of-war privileges to them. Such an argument would give states unbridled detention authority at the cost of relatively meager treatment protections. Nevertheless, it may be that states have sometimes granted prisoner-of-war status to undeserving groups in order to claim authority to detain. See Luisa Vierucci, Prisoners of War or Protected Persons qua Unlawful Combatants? The Judicial Safeguards to Which Guantanamo Bay Detainees Are Entitled, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 284, 300 n.76 (2003) (explaining that the British detained Iraqi students as prisoners of war during the first Gulf war in order to exercise detention authority).
71 See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, Expert Opinion on Whether Israel’s Targeted Killings of Palestinian Terrorists Is Consonant with International Humanitarian Law, at 14, HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Ist. v. Gov’t of Ist., supra note 26, available at http://www.stoptorture.org.il/files/cassese.pdf (“It must be underlined again that no ‘intermediate status’ exists between that of combatant and the status of civilian.”); Dörmann, supra note 68, at 72 (“Thus for the purposes of the law on the conduct of hostilities, there is no gap. Either a person is a combatant or a civilian.”); Goodman, supra note 66, at 51 (arguing that civilians who take part in hostilities remain civilians); Marco Sassoli, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the “War on Terrorism,” 22 L. & INEQ. 195, 207–08 (2004) (marshaling support for this position). This approach is taken by the Israeli Supreme Court. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Ist. v. Gov’t of Ist., supra note 26, para. 28 (“It is difficult for us to see how a third category can be recognized in the framework of the Hague and Geneva Conventions.”).
72 See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Ist. v. Gov’t of Ist., supra note 26, para. 28 (holding Palestinian terrorists to be civilians because the law does not recognize any categories other than lawful combatant and civilian).
73 See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, Art. 42 (allowing for detention of civilians when demanded by security). Article 43 of the Fourth Geneva Convention specifies procedures for authorizing detention that require individualized review, as is discussed in part III.
view that all individuals fall within the categories of prisoner of war or protected person point to the official ICRC commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states it was not the intention of the drafters to leave any group of individuals uncovered. Those in favor of this approach also draw support from the text of the Convention. Article 4 does not expressly exclude those who are engaged in fighting from protected person status. And Article 5 suggests by negative inference that engaging in hostile activities in the territory of a party to the conflict or in occupied territory does not necessarily deprive an individual of protected person status.

Under the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention, however, many members of nonstate groups, because of their nationality, are not entitled to protected person status. Excluded from protected person status are nationals of the party or occupying power, nationals of neutral states in the territory of a belligerent state, and nationals of co-belligerent states, provided that these states have diplomatic representation with the detaining state. As a consequence, members of nonstate groups often will be excluded from protected person status based on their citizenship. In Afghanistan, for example, Taliban fighters picked up by the Afghan government would not be entitled to protected person status because they are citizens of Afghanistan. Those same fighters picked up by the United States would also not be protected persons, because they are nationals of co-belligerent states with which the United States has normal diplomatic relations. Nor would most foreign Al Qaeda fighters picked up by coalition forces in Afghanistan be protected persons, because almost all are nationals of “neutral states” that have diplomatic relations with coalition members.

Moreover, the negotiating history of the Fourth Geneva Convention calls into question the conclusion that protected person status was intended to be a safety net protecting those who took up arms illegally. Nowhere within the debate at the conference did delegates suggest that all combatants not qualifying for prisoner-of-war status were entitled to protected person status, and some delegations made specific comments to the contrary. For those engaged in

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74 See INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, GENEVA CONVENTION [IV] RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR: COMMENTARY 51 (Jean S. Picter gen. ed., 1960) [hereinafter FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION COMMENTARY] (“Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law.”).

75 See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, Art. 5 (describing protections for protected persons who are detained as “a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power”); see also FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION COMMENTARY, supra note 74, at 53 (explaining that the need to provide protections to those accused of acts like sabotage and terrorism requires treating them as protected persons).

76 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, Art. 4. “Normal diplomatic representation” requires that the states have at least one diplomatic representative accredited to the belligerent state who has the freedom to make diplomatic representations. FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION COMMENTARY, supra note 74, at 49. The consequence of normal diplomatic relations is that states may use normal diplomatic channels, including consular visits, to protect the interests of their nationals with the belligerent state. Id.

77 The ICTY in Tadić held that in some instances ethnicity may trump formal nationality in determining whether a person qualifies for protected person status. Thus, Bosnian Yugoslavs held by the rump, Serb-dominated Yugoslavia were effectively diplomatically abandoned and consequently entitled to protected person status. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Jurisdiction, Case No. IT–94–1–AR72, paras. 165–69 (July 15, 1999). Under a more functional approach to protected person status, some nonstate groups might gain protected person status based on diplomatic abandonment by their home states.

78 For example, a British delegate at the Geneva Conference explained that “the whole conception of the Civilian Convention was the protection of civilian victims of war and not the protection of illegitimate bearers of arms,” who “could not expect full protection under rules of war to which they did not conform.” 2 FINAL RECORD OF THE
fighting who are entitled to protected person status, Article 5 allows states to deny most privileges to those within its territory or occupied territory who are under suspicion of engaging in activities hostile to the security of the state. Presumably, nonstate fighters often would fall within this exclusion.

This apparent gap in the law has led some states and scholars to argue that the law includes a third category, sometimes called “unlawful combatants” or “unprivileged belligerents.” While supporters of the two-category approach dispute whether the category exists, it has a long historical pedigree. Supporters of this three-category approach note that the Fourth Geneva Convention was designed to protect those for whom fighting is not a regular occupation—but not those who illegitimately bear arms on a consistent basis. They also note that treating such fighters as civilians would create limitations on targeting that would create the perverse reality that states have lesser leeway to target those who violate the laws of war, because they are civilians, than in fighting lawful combatants.

During the Bush administration, Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters were labeled “unlawful combatants” or simply “enemy combatants.” See Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, Attorney General, and Other Officials, para. 2(d) (Feb. 7, 2002), at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/020702bush.pdf [hereinafter Bush memorandum] (concluding that Taliban detainees are “unlawful combatants” and that Al Qaeda detainees do not get prisoner-of-war protections); Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to the Secretary of the Navy, para. (a) (July 7, 2004), at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf [hereinafter Wolfowitz memorandum] (defining as enemy combatant “an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.”). The Obama administration dropped the term “enemy combatant” but continues to assert the right to detain members of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces and “substantial supporters” as authorized by Congress. Brief for Respondent, Hamilby v. Obama, 616 F.Supp.2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 05-0763). Observers have rightly concluded that both administrations have claimed the right to detain these individuals until the end of hostilities based on their status. See Benjamin Wittes, Robert Chesney, & Rabea Benhalim, The Emerging Law of Detention: The Guantánamo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking 16–17 (2010) (describing the minor changes to detention authority claimed by the Obama administration).

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See Curtis A. Bradley, The United States, Israel & Unlawful Combatants, 12 Green Bag 2d 397, 404–05 (2009) (marshaling arguments in favor of viewing nonstate fighters as a subset of combatants not entitled to protections as either prisoners of war or protected persons); Ingrid Detter, The Law of War 148 (2000) (arguing that an unlawful combatant is one committing belligerent acts against a state while not part of a regular military force or militia); Dinsein, supra note 63, at 29 (explaining that an unlawful combatant “is a combatant in the sense that he can be lawfully targeted by the enemy, but he cannot claim the privileges appertaining to lawful combatancy”); Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, Arts. 84, 85 (1898) (originally issued as General Orders No. 100) (categorizing private persons who sabotage behind enemy lines as undeserving of prisoner-of-war status and subject to summary execution); W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. Rev. 1, 83 (1990) (criticizing Additional Protocol I for failing to respect the traditional category of “unprivileged belligerent”); Adam Roberts, Counterterrorism and the Laws of War: A Critique of the U.S. Approach, Remarks at the Brookings Institution (Mar. 11, 2002), at http://www.brookings.edu/events/2002/0311terrorism.aspx (“There is a long record of certain people coming into the category of unlawful combatants—pirates, spies, saboteurs, and so on. It has been absurd that there should have been a debate about whether or not that category exists.”); Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 511, 522 (2005) (“[U]nlawful combatants or unprivileged belligerents . . . are either civilians who have joined the conflict or members of a purported military organization who do not meet the requirements for lawful combatant status.”).

Generally, nonstate fighters are not subject to targeting unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. Additional Protocol I, supra note 23, Art. 51(3). Categorizing nonstate fighters as civilians would mean that the state could not target these fighters at all times, as it could a state army, but rather only “for such time” as they are participating.
Unlawful combatants, like lawful combatants, are subject to detention based on their status as combatants, although without the privileges of prisoner-of-war status. Unlike the category of lawful combatant, however, no strictly drawn boundaries delimit the category of unlawful combatant. Such boundaries are necessary to determine what relationship an individual must have with an enemy organization in order to be detained.

This issue has stymied the U.S. federal courts in their efforts to determine the scope of U.S. detention authority in the conflict with Al Qaeda. The Supreme Court held in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) after the 9/11 attacks authorized detaining an individual who “was part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’ there.” Following this decision, much legal debate has centered on the question of what relationship an individual must have with enemy forces to fall within the congressional authorization.

The Obama administration has argued that the AUMF should be interpreted in light of IHL detention authority. The administration’s view is that the AUMF grants to the executive the power to detain those individuals whose relationship to Al Qaeda or the Taliban “would, in appropriately analogous circumstances in a traditional international armed conflict, render them detainable.” Such a test leaves those involved in the 9/11 attacks, as well as “persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,” subject to detention. Unable to come up with a test for who is “part of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban, or to identify how much support is sufficiently “substantial” to justify detention, the administration suggested that the test should combine formal and functional elements. Under its approach, an individual may be detained based on evidence either of formal affiliation with the enemy organization (such as an oath of loyalty) or of functional affiliation (such as joint training or staying in enemy guesthouses).

Some judges on the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia developed a more robust membership test using law-of-war principles, referred to here as the “command-structure test.” Under that test, members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban are subject to detention if it also means that some nonstate group members could not be targeted at all because their participation is insufficiently direct, even though someone engaged in an identical function for a state army would be subject to targeting. See Richard D. Rosen, Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror: Preserving Civilian Immunity, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 683, 736–39 (2009) (commenting on perverse consequences of viewing militant groups as groups of civilians). The Israeli Supreme Court acknowledged these difficulties in concluding that Palestinian militants were civilians, but sought to resolve the concern by defining “direct participation” broadly and viewing the rest period between terrorist acts by committed militants as a form of participation. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr., supra note 26.

83 As discussed earlier, unlawful combatants would still be entitled, at a minimum, to the treatment protections of common Article 3 as a matter of customary international law.


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85 See Brief for Respondent, Hamilily v. Obama (“The detention authority conferred by the AUMF is necessarily informed by principles of the laws of war.”). As discussed below, the D.C. Circuit rejected this view in Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010).


87 See Brief for Respondent, Hamilily v. Obama (“It is neither possible nor advisable . . . to attempt to identify, in the abstract, the precise nature and degree of ‘substantial support’ . . . that . . . would be sufficient to bring persons . . . within the foregoing framework.”).
“the individual functions or participates within or under the command structure of the organization—i.e., whether he receives and executes orders or directions.” Application of this test led to conflicting answers as to whether those who “substantially support” Al Qaeda and the Taliban are subject to detention.

But further development of this test has been stymied by the three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in *Al-Bihani v. Obama*, which explicitly rejected reliance on international law, IHL or otherwise, in interpreting the scope of detention authority granted by Congress in the AUMF. The panel held that only U.S. law is relevant to interpreting the AUMF. Relying on the text of the AUMF and the Military Commissions Act of 2009, the panel concluded that individuals who have “purposefully and materially supported” hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners are subject to detention as unprivileged belligerents. This definition has been criticized as overbroad because a supporter of Al Qaeda or the Taliban whose function does not resemble that of a combatant, such as a business associate, would be subject to detention until the cessation of hostilities.

Other scholars and groups completely reject the war paradigm—and with it, IHL—as a means of analyzing detention questions. They contend, instead, that national law, constrained by international human rights law, is the applicable legal framework for detention in a conflict with a nonstate actor. Some of these individuals and groups argue that a state may detain only those whom it plans to prosecute for criminal violations, is criminally prosecuting, or has criminally convicted. But as we explained above, this narrow view is problematic as a matter of legal interpretation, given that human rights law actually permits security detention in some instances, and that criminal prosecution is often impractical as a matter of policy.

That said, human rights law provides limited guidance on who is subject to security detention. The only substantive restriction on security detention in the ICCPR is that such detention should not be “arbitrary,” which “is not to be equated with ‘against the law’, but must

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88 Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.Supp.2d at 75; see also Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 57, at 1122 (advocating similar approach).
89 See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.Supp.2d at 76 (explaining difference in application of command-structure test from a previous D.C. district court opinion).
90 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d at 871 (describing as “mistaken” the contention that AUMF detention authority must be read in light of international law). Seven judges of the D.C. Circuit subsequently indicated their view that this statement was dictum. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (2010) (Sentelle, J., concurring in denial of reh’g en banc). The conclusion also appears to be at odds with the Supreme Court decision in *Hamdi*, where the Court looked to international law to interpret the AUMF. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion) (relying on international law to conclude that AUMF grants authority to the executive to detain members of the Taliban); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, *Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism*, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2092 (2005) (arguing law of war is limiting principle on detention authorized by AUMF).
91 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d at 872.
93 See supra notes 50–59 and accompanying text (describing problems with “prosecute or release” model).
95 See ICCPR, supra note 48, Art. 9(1) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.”).
be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and illegality. In practical terms, all that is required is that detention be reasonably necessary for a legitimate government purpose, such as security. Thus, the Human Rights Committee criticized the Israeli practice of detaining Lebanese as “bargaining chips” even though the Lebanese posed no threat to Israeli security. The Committee has also policed the length of preventive detention, as we discuss further below. But beyond these points, existing standards do not tell us what kinds of security threats merit noncriminal detention.

In our view, therefore, law must be developed to provide additional guidance on who is subject to detention in conflicts with nonstate actors. As states try to address this question, it appears to us that two alternative routes have emerged that require further consideration. First, states could adopt a rule permitting detention of those members of nonstate groups who pose an imperative threat to security. The Obama administration recently announced that a similar standard would be applied by Periodic Review Boards determining whether continued detention is mandated for those whom the administration originally designated for detention or prosecution. This regime is premised on individualized determinations of prospective threat, as provided in the Fourth Geneva Convention for protected persons and in preventive detention regimes permitted by human rights law.

If such an approach is adopted, consideration must be given to the degree of discretion that international law should grant states in determining whether a particular kind and intensity of security risk merits detention. Our experience explaining U.S. detention criteria to our allies suggests discomfort with a system that affords states too wide a discretion in this area. Slippery-slope concerns about expansion of noncriminal detention into other areas may explain part of the discomfort. Establishing this type of detention regime also requires states to develop relevant procedures to predict future dangerousness—which, as we discuss in part III, may be difficult.

Second, states could set boundaries around the category of unlawful combatants by developing workable criteria for determining which members of nonstate groups should, like lawful combatants, be detained under the laws of war based on their status. The inquiry under such

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98 See UN Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel, para. 21, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (1998) (criticizing practice of holding Lebanese as bargaining chips in return for captured Israeli soldiers or their corpses).
100 See David C. Fathi, Dangers of a Preventive Detention Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 1, 2009, at A19 (arguing that allowing preventive detention without requirement of mental illness risks “civil commitment exception from swallowing the rule that those whom the government wants to imprison must first be provided with the protections of a criminal trial”); cf. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that to allow civil commitment statute for sexual predators to evade Fifth Amendment requirements could lead to expansion of civil commitment statutes to avoid constitutional protections for criminal defendants).
101 An alternative to preventive, wartime detention would be to criminalize membership in an enemy organization. Indeed, many of the criteria suggested below for determining membership in an enemy nonstate group are acts that are illegal under the domestic law of many states. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §2339 (2010) (criminalizing various acts as material support for terrorism). Criminalizing membership in enemy nonstate groups is limited by national and international law protections for freedom of association. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 222
an approach would focus not on whether any particular individual presents a prospective risk, but on whether the individual falls within a category subject to detention.

Several potential ways of moving forward under this rubric are available. One option is to develop further the command-structure criteria that have been used in the D.C. district courts in the Guantánamo habeas litigation. Under that test, individuals who give or receive orders from nonstate groups with which a state is at war would be subject to detention. An alternative approach is to focus on the function of the individual, allowing for detention of those group members whose functions most closely match those of traditional combatants. Yet another possibility, proposed by the Obama administration (and mentioned earlier), is to create a hybrid set of criteria that allows for detention when individuals either satisfy formal indicia of membership in particular organizations (such as a formal oath of loyalty to the group, as is sometimes used by Al Qaeda) or engage in activities that create a functional equivalent.

The advantage of a categorical approach is that it is more amenable to a "single-shot" process because the only question is whether an individual falls within the category subject to detention. But using a particular category to define unlawful combatant subject to detention would leave open the question of when membership in that category is no longer a sufficient basis for detention. The traditional answer for armed conflict—namely, ending detention at the end of hostilities—breaks down in these conflicts, as we discuss in part IV.

Developing either approach more fully would go a long way toward clarifying the scope of detention authority for states in conflicts with nonstate actors.

III. WHAT PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FOR DETAINEES?

Our second question is what procedures should be made available to detainees for evaluating the lawfulness of their detention. Foreign governments and nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations sharply criticized the Bush administration with respect to the procedures it provided to detainees in the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The Bush administration generally resisted providing detainees process—from failing to create an administrative process to review the individual cases before being pressured by the federal courts, to opposition to federal court involvement in cases concerning detainees held outside the United States.

We believe those decisions to have been poor policy, given the nature of conflicts with nonstate actors. Legal process is needed to determine whether any particular individual is subject to detention, because of the high risk of erroneously identifying individuals as members of nonstate groups. Nonstate fighters are unlikely to wear uniforms or carry identification cards that clearly...
indicate membership in the group. And these fighters have every incentive to obfuscate regarding their membership: they are subject to prosecution for their belligerent acts due to a lack of combatant immunity, and are unlikely to receive prisoner-of-war privileges from admitting combatant activity.

Given these factors, it is surprising that the Geneva Conventions provisions governing non-international armed conflict are silent on the availability of review procedures. Common Article 3, Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, and Additional Protocol II, while all contemplating detention of enemy fighters, do not require states to employ any particular set of procedures to determine who is subject to detention.\(^\text{104}\)

As with the question of who is subject to detention, rules from international armed conflict are inadequate to fill the gap. In international armed conflicts most combatants are detained without any prior process confirming that they are subject to detention. No such process is needed because most lawful combatants do not contest that they engaged in belligerent acts. Unlike non-state fighters, lawful combatants benefit from prisoner-of-war protections linked to their status—a powerful incentive to admit to that status. Challenges would typically be futile in any event since combatants are so often captured in uniform, on the battlefield, in the course of belligerent acts.

The only detention-related procedure specified for combatants in the Third Geneva Convention is Article 5.\(^\text{105}\) “Should any doubt arise” whether a detainee who has committed “a belligerent act” deserves prisoner-of-war status, Article 5 provides that he should “enjoy the protection” of the Third Geneva Convention until his status is determined otherwise “by a competent tribunal.” Article 5 tribunals were envisioned to perform a limited, but important, function: to determine whether a detained person who has committed a belligerent act receives prisoner-of-war status.\(^\text{106}\) But because Article 5 grants the right of a tribunal only to those who have committed belligerent acts, it is not strictly relevant to the antecedent question of whether the detainee has actually committed a belligerent act.\(^\text{107}\)

Text aside, it is consistent with the spirit of Article 5 for the “competent tribunal” to consider whether the detainee in question is not a belligerent but an innocent civilian who has never

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\(^{104}\) See Kellenberger, supra note 2 (describing ICRC conclusions that “[t]here are simply no procedural safeguards in treaties of humanitarian law to deal with [security internees] during non-international armed conflicts.”).

\(^{105}\) Article 75 of Additional Protocol I provides procedural protections accompanying trials on criminal charges of combatants in an international armed conflict. It provides nothing, however, regarding the procedures that must accompany the decision to detain the combatant.

\(^{106}\) THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 77 (explaining that a consequence of the tribunal determination would be whether detainee could be prosecuted for “taking part in the fight without the right to do so”).

\(^{107}\) The limited scope of Article 5 is confirmed by the provision’s negotiating history. The original draft text of Article 5(2) read as follows: “Should any doubt arise whether any of these persons belong to one of the categories named in said Article . . . .” FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION COMMENTARY, supra note 74, at 77.

During the negotiation of the Geneva Conventions, the Dutch proposed an amendment limiting “these persons” entitled to a “competent tribunal” to persons who had committed a belligerent act and fell into the powers of the enemy. This amendment reflected the concern that captured prisoners who had committed belligerent acts were subject to summary execution as franc tireurs and therefore needed a competent tribunal to adjudicate their status. See FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at 270–71 (1949) (quoting Dutch representative explaining that multiple individuals needed to be involved in determining whether someone who committed a belligerent act deserved prisoner-of-war status because of the risk that “he will be considered to be a franc tireur and be put against the wall and shot on the spot.”); see also FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION COMMENTARY, supra note 74, at 78 (stating that the Dutch clarification of who received Article 5 tribunals “reduce[d] the number of doubtful cases in any future conflict”).
committed a belligerent act. U.S. Army Regulation 190-8, which implements Article 5 for the United States, specifically allows U.S. military tribunals to inquire whether a captured person is an “[i]nno cent civilian who should be immediately returned to his home or released.”

The Bush administration declined to provide tribunals under AR 190-8 to determine the status of captured Al Qaeda or Taliban members because the president found that no doubt existed as to whether they deserved such status. This decision conflated the question of whether members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda qualified for prisoner-of-war status with the separate question of whether the detainees were, in fact, affiliated with those groups. Given the doubts that many detainees were raising regarding their relationship with the enemy organizations, AR 190-8 tribunals could have played an important role in determining whether the detainees were actually belligerents. This departure from traditional U.S. military practice resulted in the detention of some apparently uninvolved civilians for years longer than necessary.

After the Supreme Court’s 2004 decisions in Rasul and Hamdi, the United States began providing detainees with Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) that were patterned on the procedures of AR 190-8. Despite the use of familiar procedures, however, CSRTs were criticized by the U.S. Supreme Court, among others, for their failure to allow detainees legal representation during hearings, their overreliance on hearsay and classified evidence, and detainees’ limited opportunity to introduce exculpatory evidence or to rebut the evidence against them. After the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 replaced habeas corpus

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108 See Murphy, supra note 67, at 1131 (arguing that “spirit” of Article 5 encompasses this question).
110 See Bush memorandum, supra note 79, para. 2(d) (finding that Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters were not entitled to prisoner-of-war status); see also Katharine Q. Seelye, Detainees Are Not P.O.W.’s, Cheney and Rumsfeld Declare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at A6 (quoting then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld explaining decision not to grant Article 5 hearings).
111 The question of whether actual Taliban members are entitled to prisoner-of-war status has been the subject of intense academic debate. See Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 367, 372–73 & nn. 24–25 (2004) (summarizing debate regarding prisoner-of-war status in conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban).
112 Detainees were screened by the U.S. military after capture on the battlefield and later at a centralized detention facility to ensure that only belligerents were subject to further detention. Brief for Respondents at 5–6, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343). But there was no formalized process of executive branch review outside the theater of operations, or any external check on that determination, including no right to legal representation or judicial review. See id. at 13–16 (summarizing U.S. government arguments against judicial imposition of formalized review requirements at Guantánamo Bay). As a consequence, only about one-third of the detainees initially brought to Guantánamo Bay were linked to Al Qaeda. BENJAMIN WITTES & ZAAHIRA WYNE, THE CURRENT DETAINEE POPULATION AT GUANTANAMO: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 2 (2008), at http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/1216_detainees_wittes.aspx. Subsequent judicial review demonstrated a large percentage of detainees were held without adequate evidence of their participation in the conflict. See WITTES ET AL., supra note 79, at 10 (explaining that in three-fourths of Guantánamo habeas cases, the Court has ordered the detainee released).
113 See Rasul v. Bush, supra note 112, at 485 (holding that the federal habeas statute allowed courts to hear petitions filed by detainees at Guantánamo Bay).
114 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 84, at 533 (holding that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause required that a U.S. citizen picked up on the battlefield in Afghanistan be provided both notice of the reasons for his detention and the opportunity to rebut those reasons in front of a neutral decision maker).
115 See Wolfowitz memorandum, supra note 79 (creating CSRTs).
116 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (criticizing CSRTs for limiting, because of lack of counsel, detainees’ opportunity to present exculpatory evidence). The Defense Department also employed personnel for the tribunals who lacked experience in evaluating the intelligence information that was generally the basis for government detention. Declaration of Lt. Col. Stephen Abraham, Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir., 2007);
review with more limited review of the CSRT determinations in the U.S. federal courts,\(^{117}\) the process was also criticized for providing inadequate judicial supervision of detention decisions.\(^{118}\)

These criticisms reflect the failure of Article 5 to prescribe adequate procedures to govern tribunals making status determinations.\(^ {119}\) Military, civilian, and administrative tribunals all potentially meet the article’s requirements.\(^ {120}\) Panels of military officers,\(^ {121}\) a single military legal officer,\(^ {122}\) and courts are used by different states to conduct Article 5 reviews.\(^ {123}\) The article also includes no requirements concerning counsel or appeal. Whereas some states provide legal representation at hearings at the taxpayer’s expense,\(^ {124}\) others provide only assistance from military officers (as occurs with CSRTs)\(^ {125}\) or no assistance at all.\(^ {126}\) States differ, too, concerning the right to appeal, with some allowing appeals only to military officials,\(^ {127}\) and others to higher-level courts.\(^ {128}\) Since the criticisms of CSRT procedures would also apply to Article 5 tribunals, it is fair to infer that procedures beyond those required by the Third Geneva Convention need to be developed.


\(^ {118}\) See, e.g., Brian J. Foley, *Guantanamo and Beyond: Dangers of Rigging the Rules*, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1009, 1034–35 (2007) (criticizing Detainee Treatment Act review scheme); Rona, supra note 40, at 148–49 (same). In *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. at 732, the Court held that detainees held at Guantánamo Bay are protected by the Suspension Clause, and found Congress acted unconstitutionally in stripping their habeas rights.

\(^ {119}\) Of course, Article 5 does expect that tribunals be “fair, competent, and impartial.” See United States v. Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791, 796 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (describing concerns of the drafters of the Geneva Conventions). The lack of opportunity for Guantánamo detainees to rebut secret evidence and to introduce exculpatory evidence has raised concerns about fairness.

\(^ {120}\) The original text of Article 5 proposed resolution of such doubt by a “responsible authority.” This text was replaced by “competent tribunal” in order to preclude giving responsibility for this determination to a single person of subordinate authority. *THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION COMMENTARY*, supra note 26, at 77; see also Thomas L. Hemingway, *Wartime Detention of Enemy Combatants: What If There Were a War and No One Could Be Detained Without an Attorney?*, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 63, 79 (2006) (“A ‘competent tribunal’ is not based on the law enforcement model; Article 5 tribunals are not courts.”).

\(^ {121}\) The United States uses a panel of three commissioned officers, one of whom must be of field grade, to conduct Article 5 reviews. *Army Regulation 190-8*, supra note 111, para. 1-6(c).


\(^ {123}\) See *Geneva Conventions Act*, 1957, Part III, §10(A) (Austl.) (granting jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of the state or territory where person is being held to hear status-review claims); *Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law*, sec. 5 (2002) (Isr.), at http://www.justice.gov.il/MOH/Eng/Heskein/English/HukimEnglish/ (granting judges of district court the authority to determine whether prisoner does not meet requirement for prisoner-of-war status).


\(^ {125}\) Ministry of National Defence, supra note 124, sec. 10 (providing for an officer or noncommissioned member of the military to assist the detainee).

\(^ {126}\) U.S. Army Regulation 190-8 makes no mention of representation by counsel or military personnel to assist the detainee.

\(^ {127}\) Ministry of National Defence, supra note 122, sec. 17 (allowing military authority that appointed review officer to review determination).

\(^ {128}\) See Naqvi, supra note 124, at 591 (explaining that Israel allows appeal of prisoner-of-war determinations to its Supreme Court).
Both the Fourth Geneva Convention and human rights law provide some useful procedural guidance. Unlike the Third Geneva Convention, the Fourth Geneva Convention does specify procedural protections that must be provided when detaining protected persons: (1) initial review by “an appropriate court or administrative board” specified by the state,129 (2) right of appeal, whether to an administrative body or court,130 and (3) at least twice-yearly review of detention decisions.131 These rights are supplemented by Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, which grants detainees the right to know the reasons for their detention.132 Civilian protected persons must be provided greater process than combatants because of the different nature of the detention inquiry. Individualized assessment of whether a protected person poses a security risk, as is contemplated by the Fourth Geneva Convention, requires process. As discussed above, however, it is unlikely that nonstate fighters would qualify for protected person status as a matter of law, although the procedural requirements are a valuable touchstone for legal development.

The IHL procedural requirements for detention of protected persons are somewhat similar to the procedural requirements found in human rights law governing administrative detention. Human rights treaties, like Article 75, require that states give detainees notice of the reasons for their detention.133 Unlike IHL, however, the opportunity to challenge that detention promptly must occur in front of a judicial body,134 presumably with counsel,135 and include appeal to a higher-level court. These general similarities have led to a consensus among scholars regarding the need to provide detainees notice of the reasons for their detention,136 the opportunity to rebut those reasons in front of independent decision makers,137 and the right to appeal adverse judgments.138

129 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, Art. 43. Article 78 does not spell out the locus of review, but the ICRC commentary suggests a requirement similar to Article 43. See FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION COMMENTARY, supra note 74, at 368 (explaining that occupying power “must observe the stipulations of Article 43, which contains a precise and detailed statement of the procedure to be followed when a protected person . . . is interned”).

130 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, Art. 78. Whether appeals are heard by a “court” or a “board” is left to the occupying power. FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION COMMENTARY, supra note 74, at 368–69. Protected persons detained in the territory of a party to the conflict have no comparable right.

131 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, Arts. 43, 78.

132 Additional Protocol I, supra note 23, Art. 75(3) (“Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed conflict shall be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the reasons why these measures have been taken.”).

133 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 48, Art. 9(2) (“Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.”) The Human Rights Committee has interpreted this provision to extend a right to administrative detainees to know the reasons for their detention. UN Human Rights Comm., supra note 52, para. 4.

134 See ICCPR, supra note 48, Art. 9(4) (“Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.”); American Convention, supra note 49, Art. 7(6) (“Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a competent court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention and order his release if the arrest or detention is unlawful.”); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 49, Art. 5(4) (“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”).

135 See UN Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel, para. 13, UN Doc. CCPR/C/78/ISR (2003) (recommended Israel provide anyone detained access to a lawyer within forty-eight hours); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 84, at 539 (holding that a U.S. citizen detained as an enemy combatant “unquestionably has the right to access to counsel” in habeas proceedings).

136 See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 57, at 1128–29 (describing difficult evidentiary questions that follow from recognizing such a right); Ashley S. Deeks, Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES.

2011] DETENTION OPERATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS 225
While we agree with the importance of providing notice, review, and some form of appeal in conflicts with nonstate actors, implementation of these requirements creates new difficulties. One problem is posed by the prevalence of classified information in cases against nonstate actors. A body reviewing state evidence against a nonstate actor may need to assess intelligence information and foreign government communications, which the executive is traditionally loathe to share with the courts. The state may prefer to share such information in the form of intelligence summaries, but it is difficult for a court to assess such evidence without access to the sources that are the basis for intelligence reports. These concerns led the U.S. government to argue in favor of administrative review of detention cases, with extremely limited court review, if it is to occur at all.

We believe that the good performance of the D.C. Circuit to date in reviewing the cases of Guantánamo detainees suggests that courts may review cases of this sort while protecting classified information. The decision in Bismullah v. Gates may provide a useful starting point for designing review requirements. The D.C. Circuit rejected the government’s argument that ex parte, in camera review of classified information should be the norm in hearings reviewing CSRT determinations. The court held that there was a presumption that defense counsel with the requisite security clearance had a “need to know” all information about their clients’ cases. But the court also allowed that in exceptional situations—involving “highly sensitive information, or information pertaining to a highly sensitive source or to anyone other than the detainee”—the government could present evidence to the court alone, ex parte and in camera. This outcome reflects a sensitive and sensible balance between the need to protect information and the need to protect the rights of detainees; it is a balance that must be struck in any notice and review requirement.


137 See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 57, at 1131 (describing as “preferable” insertion of “a judicial decision-maker at the front end of the process”); Deeks, supra note 136, at 433 (arguing that Fourth Geneva Convention requirement of “initial review of the detention by an independent court or board” be extended to detainees in non-international armed conflict); Pejic, supra note 136, at 386 (“Review of the lawfulness of internment/administrative detention must be carried out by an independent and impartial body”).

138 See Deeks, supra note 136 (arguing for “right of appeal” in detention in noninternational armed conflict).

139 See Mahjoub v. Canada, [2005] F.C. 156, para. 54 (Can.) (refusing to accept Immigration Ministry finding that Mahjoub posed a threat to Canada, absent evidence that minister had independently reviewed intelligence information, including source material); Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 846–47 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding government evidence could not be assessed without consideration of the reliability of the sources).

140 See Brief for Respondent at 25–27, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 84 (No. 03-6696) (arguing that the “Executive’s Determination That an Individual Is an Enemy Combatant Is Entitled to the Utmost Deference by a Court”); Brief for Respondents at 52–59, Rasul v. Bush, supra note 112 (same).

The Obama administration has questioned in other contexts the role of the judiciary in reviewing classified information. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (affirming government contention that suit concerning extraordinary renditions could not be heard, because of the link between the allegations in the case and classified information).

141 See Bismullah v. Gates, supra note 116, at 187 (“Counsel simply cannot argue, nor can the court determine, whether a preponderance of the evidence supports the Tribunal’s status determination without seeing all the evidence.”).

142 See id. at 187–88 (suggesting judicial deference to executive branch determinations that evidence was so sensitive that disclosure was impossible).
A second difficulty concerning judicial review is whether it is feasible in conflicts having larger numbers of detainees. For example, the demands that the U.S. federal courts have imposed on the government in justifying detention at Guantánamo could not practically be applied if many more detainees were involved. In 2007, the D.C. Circuit in Bismullah v. Gates interpreted the Detainee Treatment Act as granting the court the authority to review all reasonably available information in the government’s possession bearing on the issue of whether the detainee was an enemy combatant. In seeking en banc and later Supreme Court review of the decision, the United States explained that meeting such demands required “hundreds of man-hours” per case, diverting valuable intelligence and military resources from the ongoing war effort. While these demands may be met relatively easily with small numbers of detainees, such as the population at Guantánamo, they would be impractical if imposed in conflicts with nonstate actors resulting in thousands of detainees. In those cases, administrative review may be more realistic.

Beyond these considerations regarding the scope of the right to notice and review, we believe that further legal development is needed on three procedural questions that will arise during reviews. First, procedural minimums for many aspects of detention hearings need to be established. How should the reviewing entity handle important questions such as the standard of proof, evidentiary restrictions, and the obligation to share information with the detainee? How quickly must the review occur? Detention in a conflict with a nonstate actor requires standards on these issues that are less stringent than in peacetime criminal detention but that are more exacting than in traditional international armed conflict. Although different legal systems might reach different answers to these questions, an international floor would help states structure their procedures.

Second, it must be determined whether reviews can be conducted only once or whether periodic status reviews are required. Here, the substance of the review, as discussed in the part II, is critical. If individualized dangerousness is the standard, as is the case in administrative detention governed by human rights law and by security detention governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention, the review procedures will need to allow for periodic assessment of whether the threat persists over time. By contrast, when the inquiry is whether a detainee falls within a category where detention is permitted, such as detention of combatants under the Third Geneva Convention, a one-time determination that the detainee falls within the category may be sufficient.

Third, the law should provide guidance on what role geography should play in determining what process, if any, is due. The U.S. federal courts have linked the level of process afforded to detainees with the locations where they are detained. Thus, detainees held at Guantánamo

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143 See id. at 435 (questioning whether it is feasible to provide counsel and judicial review in conflicts in which state detains thousands of individuals); Marco Sassoli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Noninternational Armed Conflicts, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 599, 622 (2008) (same).


146 The Obama administration apparently agrees. See Motion for Certification of This Court’s April 2, 2009 Order for Interlocutory Appeal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b), Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F.Supp.2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (arguing that so many individuals would be able to bring habeas petitions in Afghanistan under the district court’s ruling that implementation would be prohibitively difficult).

147 See Waxman, supra note 56, at 35.
Bay receive substantial process, including the right of habeas corpus, whereas detainees held in Afghanistan and Iraq receive far less, even when they are picked up somewhere else and then transferred there. At first blush, this distinction makes some sense. It is far more difficult to conduct hearings and court reviews when individuals are located in an area of active hostilities. And to the extent that detainees held near an active battlefield are captured in combat, the need for process may be less, given the dearth of innocent explanations for firing a gun at a state’s armed forces. Capturing forces may also be less equipped in heavy fighting to collect the evidence that additional process would require.

Despite the superficial attractions of making geographic distinctions in relation to the detention of nonstate fighters, the situation is not so straightforward, and criticisms abound. Many potential captures, both near a zone of active hostilities and away, involve individuals in civilian settings who will be difficult to distinguish from actual civilians, creating a need for greater process rather than less. The very concept of a battlefield may be itself difficult to maintain when operations are taking place in urban settings or hostile villages. And allowing procedural requirements to vary based on geography creates perverse incentives for states. If, as the D.C. Circuit has held, states may capture individuals away from an area of active hostilities but then bring them to one and thereby avoid providing process, they will have an incentive to do just that. Such an incentive is directly contrary to the humanitarian impulses of both the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, which require shielding captured persons from the dangers posed by active warfare. Equally important, moving detainees to a battlefield detention facility does not either address or reduce the difficult factual questions surrounding their detention. Further consideration needs to be given to modulating process requirements to account for geographic differences, without creating zones with no procedural requirements of any sort.

IV. WHEN DOES THE CONFLICT END?

A major reason for the intense debate on the scope of detention authority and the procedural safeguards for detainees is concern about the length of detention. Foreign governments and human rights groups frequently complained to us that detention as a combatant in the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban amounted to a sentence of life imprisonment.

The source of this complaint is that the United States has applied the IHL end-of-detention rule applicable in noninternational armed conflict to detention of Al Qaeda and Taliban members. As a matter of customary IHL, and as specifically provided in Additional Protocol II, enemy combatants may be detained until at least the end of active hostilities, and perhaps longer. Article 2(2) of Additional Protocol II specifies that the treaty’s treatment protections extend beyond the end of the armed conflict “until the end of such deprivation or restriction

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148 See Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d at 87 (holding detainees picked up outside of Afghanistan and transported there have no right of habeas corpus).

149 Id.

150 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 1, Art. 19 (“Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger.”); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, Art. 83 (“The Detaining Power shall not set up places of internment in areas particularly exposed to the dangers of war.”).
of liberty.” The official ICRC commentary on Additional Protocol II explains that while “in principle” detentions should terminate at the “end of active hostilities,” they may continue after the end of fighting “for security reasons.” Critics asked us the reasonable question of how the United States would ever identify the “end of active hostilities.”

This indeterminacy is inherent in a rule premised on an event (end of hostilities) whose timing is, by definition, unknown while hostilities continue. Detention until the end of active hostilities is authorized because it is necessary to prevent combatants returning to the battlefield. When the fighting ends, the justification for detention evaporates, at which point the detaining state becomes obligated to release its prisoners. But as sensible as this justification may be, the rule subjects wartime prisoners to indefinite, potentially long-term detention.

Identifying the end of active hostilities presents difficulties even in international armed conflicts. The Korean War ended with an armistice agreement rather than a formal peace treaty, and cross-border skirmishes occur to this day. At what point did “active hostilities” terminate? Still, one can at least envision how most international armed conflicts will end. By contrast, it is unclear as a practical matter how a state will identify the end of many conflicts involving nonstate actors. As a general matter, conflicts with nonstate actors will not end with the signing of a formal surrender document on a battleship. Low-intensity hostilities may continue for generations, especially if a proliferation of nonstate groups operating under separate commands makes a total end to fighting difficult. The result is that a norm that requires release and repatriation only upon cessation of active hostilities may lead to life imprisonment. Such a result may be an unduly harsh consequence of involvement with a nonstate group.

See Additional Protocol II, supra note 274, Art. 2(2) (“At the end of the armed conflict, all the persons who have been deprived of their liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to such conflict . . . shall enjoy the protection of Articles 5 and 6 until the end of such deprivation or restriction of liberty.”).

COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1360 (Yves Sandoz et al., 1987). Because traditional noninternational armed conflicts are internal conflicts, internal security reasons may give states continuing security rationales for maintaining detention after the cessation of active hostilities, an option not available in international armed conflict. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 1, Art. 118 (“Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”).

It is unclear whether the federal courts will accept detention until the end of active hostilities based on the finding that a detainee is a member of Al Qaeda or the Taliban. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra note 84, at 521 (O’Connor, J., plurality) (“If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, [detention authority predicated on the law of war] may unravel.”).


See Brooks, supra note 34, at 726 (“[T]here is no obvious point at which the U.S. will be able to declare victory and end the conflict [against terrorism].”); Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against Terrorism: Guantánamo and Beyond, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 457, 484–85 (2003) (arguing that end of hostilities in the war against terrorism is impossible to picture). Of course, there are exceptions to this general pattern. Noninternational armed conflicts with traditional rebel groups that hold and govern territory are more subject to a formal end. For example, the conflict between Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers came to a definite end in 2009 with the complete military defeat of the latter. See Somini Sengupta & Seth Mydans, Rebels Routed in Sri Lanka After 25 Years of War, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2009, at A1 (reporting on announcement from the Tigers that its fight against the Sri Lankan government had “reached its bitter end.”).

See Waxman, supra note 39, at 435–36.

See In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d 443, 465–66 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Short of the death penalty, life imprisonment is the ultimate deprivation of liberty, and the uncertainty of whether the war on terror—and thus the period of incarceration—will last a lifetime may be even worse than if the detainees had been tried, convicted, and definitively sentenced to a fixed term.”).
Unhappiness with the IHL norm requires identifying an alternative, three of which have been previously discussed elsewhere. One approach is to tie conflicts with nonstate actors to related, traditional international armed conflicts whenever possible. Under this approach, the end of the traditional international armed conflict would also mark the end of the conflict with the nonstate actor, at least for detention purposes. The ICRC, for example, viewed the U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban as an international armed conflict. When the ICRC took the position that the international armed conflict between the United States and Afghanistan ended in June 2002, it concluded that the Geneva Conventions ceased providing a legal basis for detention without criminal charge of those picked up during the international armed conflict. Although the ICRC recognized that a noninternational armed conflict continued between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban (thereby justifying continued security detention), in other cases such a traditional noninternational armed conflict may not exist, meaning the end of the international armed conflict would mark the end of detention authority. For example, if Afghanistan and the Taliban were to make peace, it would be unclear whether under this approach the United States could continue to detain Al Qaeda or Taliban fighters.

Linking detention authority in conflicts with nonstate groups to associated international armed conflicts is problematic for several reasons. First, it is available only when an international armed conflict occurs in tandem with the conflict with the nonstate actor—which is often not the case. Second, identifying the end of traditional international armed conflicts can be difficult, as already discussed. Third, so long as the conflict with the nonstate actor remains ongoing, release on the basis of a related international armed conflict does not mitigate the threat posed by detainees unless their state of nationality is able and willing to ensure that they will not engage in the conflict that continues—which seems unlikely.

A second approach would be to impose a time limit on detention. Human rights law does appear to contemplate some time limit on preventive security detentions in national legal regimes, after which the state must release, prosecute, or deport the detainee—although a precise rule on duration does not exist. The most extreme version of a temporal limit to security detention would be to fix a maximum time limit (for example, two years) on security detention. Such a requirement would often result in outright release of detainees at the end of specified period since the reason for security detention is, in many instances, the inability to prosecute or deport the individual.

158 See Adam Roberts, The Laws of War in the War on Terror, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WAR ON TERROR 175, 196 n.38 (Fred L. Borch & Paul S. Wilson, eds., 2003) (quoting aide-mémoire from the ICRC to the United States dated November 19, 2002); see also Allen S. Weiner, Hamdan, TERROR, WAR, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 997, 1018–19 (2007) (arguing plausible argument can be made that United States had to release all Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees after installation of transitional government in Afghanistan); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, U.S. DETENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN: AN AIDE-MÉMOIRE FOR CONTINUED ACTION 3 (June 7, 2005), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/093/2005/en/4fa11d9e-d4de-11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/amr510932005en.pdf (arguing that United States was obligated to release all prisoners in June 2002 that it did not intend to charge criminally). But see Murphy, supra note 67, at 1123 (questioning conclusion of ICRC that international armed conflict in Afghanistan ended in June 2002 despite the continued presence of tens of thousands of U.S. troops); Maqaleh v. Gates, supra note 148, at 97 (“It is undisputed that Bagram, indeed the entire nation of Afghanistan, remains a theater of war.”).

159 See, e.g., UN Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Cameroon, para. 204, UN Doc. CCPR/ A/49/40 (1994) (explaining that ICCPR Article 9(4) requires a time limit on administrative detention).

160 Hakimi, supra note 94, at 412–13 (raising as an example a two-year maximum on security detentions before detainees must be prosecuted, deported, or released).
Outright release of dangerous nonstate fighters based on a time limit, while beneficial from the perspective of detainee, raises security risks for the detaining state. A U.S. Department of Defense report concluded that nearly 20 percent of detainees who have been released from Guantánamo Bay are suspected of engaging in terrorist activity after release. One such detainee, who was released to Saudi Arabia in 2007, is now second in command of Al Qaeda in Yemen, the group believed to have trained the suspect who attempted to destroy a U.S. airliner during Christmas 2009. Likewise, detainees returned to Kuwait in 2005 subsequently became suicide bombers in Iraq. Releasing fighters pursuant to an arbitrary time limit would be inconsistent with the purpose of preventive detention, which is to keep those who may commit acts of violence off the battlefield.

A third approach is to terminate detention authority over individual fighters when they no longer pose a threat to the security of the state. Given the inadequacies in the current, end-of-hostilities rule, we believe this approach is the most promising. It is the approach taken in the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides that states must terminate detention of protected persons when the detainee in question no longer poses a danger to the state. It has also been embraced by successive U.S. administrations in the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Curt Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have provided the intellectual architecture for this approach. The two contend such individualized reviews are akin to reconceptualizing the end of the conflict in terms of the individual rather than the nonstate group. When the conflict with a particular detainee is terminated, in the sense that the individual no longer poses a threat to the state, he must be released.

Key to a dangerousness regime is periodic review during detention, which allows the detaining state to assess continually the dangerousness of the detainee. As discussed above, the Fourth Geneva Convention specifies twice-annual reviews of detention decisions of civilians during armed conflict. Dangerousness reviews could consider the detainee’s past conduct, level of responsibility

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161 But see Christiane Shields Delessert, Release and Repatriation of Prisoners of War at the End of Active Hostilities 108 (arguing that after some time in detention, prisoners of war lose their value and therefore should be subject to release and repatriation).

162 See Elisabeth Bumiller, Many Ex-detainees Said to Be Engaged in Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at A16 (citing to a classified Pentagon report). However, many critics of the Defense Department statistics allege that many of those accused of returning to the fight have done nothing more than speak critically of the United States. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Detainees Return to the Fight, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2009, at A11 (quoting Mark Denbeaux and Human Rights Watch regarding their skepticism about Pentagon figures).


165 See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, Art. 132 (“Each interned person shall be released by the Detaining Power as soon as the reasons which necessitated his internment no longer exist.”).

166 Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 99; Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, para. 1(c), Memorandum from Gordon R. England, Sec’y of the Navy, to Sec’y of State and Others (Sept. 14, 2004) (specifying purpose of review as to determine whether “the enemy combatant represents a continuing threat to the U.S. or its allies in the ongoing armed conflict against al Qaida and its affiliates and supporters”).

167 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 90, at 2125.

168 The Bush administration tried this approach for Guantánamo detainees by establishing Administrative Review Boards (ARBs). See Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, supra note 166. While the ARBs were a good idea in theory, in reality the Defense Department allocated too few resources and provided the detainees too little process to make them effective. These failings led the Obama administration to establish its own Guantánamo Review Task Force to address much the same task.

169 See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, Arts. 43 (requiring review “at least twice yearly”), 78 (requiring review “if possible every six months”).
within the nonstate organization, statements and actions during confinement, age, health, and psychological profile. These periodic reviews could also employ progressively higher standards of proof to justify detention. The standards could begin by permitting a review as deferential as one involving the some-evidence standard, and could progressively raise the burden, over a period of years, to clear and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt. Such an approach would recognize the greater liberty interests at stake as the time spent in detention increases.

Periodic reviews raise difficult procedural questions. One such question is where reviews should take place. Periodic reviews are resource intensive and become even more so in proportion to the procedural protections involved. The most “rights protective” approach to periodic reviews would be to conduct these hearings in national courts, with detainees afforded counsel to assist in the reviews. But twice-annual judicial proceedings on dangerousness would limit a state’s ability to detain nonstate actors, as the time and financial resources involved could quickly overwhelm the judicial system. Moreover, even assuming that the resources exist, judges may be less well equipped than members of the military and intelligence personnel to determine whether a particular individual is dangerous. And it may be exceedingly difficult for any fact finder to determine when the dangerousness of any particular individual no longer requires detention. If periodic review is unlikely to produce accurate results, then it is harder to justify its costs. These concerns have led both the Bush and Obama administrations to use administrative procedures to make these reviews—which, we believe, is a reasonable position. Another question, as noted above, involves the standard of proof that the state needs to satisfy to justify detention; progressively raising the standard of proof as the time in detention increases is an approach that merits careful consideration. In such reviews, a balance needs to be struck between providing detainees with a fair chance to challenge their status and ensuring that the procedural requirements are not so stringent and burdensome that maintaining detention becomes impossible. As the time spent in detention increases, the liberty costs associated with detention also increase, meaning that the balance may shift in favor of supporting more stringent evidentiary standards to support detention.

Such a review process has limits. The greater the procedural protections provided to detainees, the greater the risk of false negatives. The discomfort with this potential outcome was apparent in the outrage expressed by members of Congress when it became known that former Guantánamo detainees were involved in the organization that assisted in the attempted bombing of a U.S.

170 The U.S. federal courts are already wrestling with the question of whether a detainee may secure earlier release by renouncing his relationship with Al Qaeda and the Taliban during confinement. The district courts have divided on the question. See WITTES ET AL., supra note 79, at 29–31 (comparing Basarâ and Awad habeas decisions).

171 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 90, at 2125.

172 See Hakimi, supra note 94, at 413 (arguing for increasing the standard of review in administrative detentions as the length of detention increases); Waxman, supra note 6, at 1408–12 (same).

173 See In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, supra note 157 (explaining that detainee liberty interest grows as the length of anticipated detention increases).

174 See Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time: A Noncriminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantánamo Bay Detainees, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 202–07 (2005) (arguing that periodic reviews in the U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda should take place in Article III courts, with detainees represented by counsel).


Airliner on Christmas day, 2009.\(^{177}\) That risk is inescapable, however; it is the cost of addressing the equally problematic risk of false positives that result from inadequate process. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to infer that procedural safeguards will necessarily prevent a state from continuing to detain those who are dangerous—and for exceedingly long terms, or even life. Administrative detention regimes employed in other contexts in the United States, such as for sex offenders, often result in repeated determinations that detention must continue, as the danger remains.

V. The End of Detention: How, Where, and with What Conditions?

Up to this point, we have considered questions that emerge from the state’s desire to detain nonstate fighters. But just as vexing a problem for the state is where to send detainees after the state determines that they should be released. Whereas the release of prisoners occurs primarily after the conclusion of hostilities in international armed conflicts or traditional, land-based civil wars, issues concerning the release of detainees may arise while a conflict with a nonstate actor is ongoing if some sort of periodic review process, such as the one endorsed in the previous section, is implemented.

One of the most difficult challenges that we faced in the State Department was determining where to transfer detainees whom the Defense Department had decided to release in the conflict with Al Qaeda. These sorts of issues arise rarely in international armed conflict, in which it is assumed lawful combatants will be returned to their state of nationality, in whose armed forces they had been serving. It is also not a problem in internal conflicts, in which those detained by the state are nationals of that same state. By contrast, at Guantánamo alone, the United States detained individuals from more than forty countries.\(^{178}\)

The State Department encountered considerable logistical difficulties in returning detainees to a wide range of countries, given the time and resources involved in concluding scores of repatriation agreements. The department’s efforts were made more difficult by a number of detainees who had little or no connection with their states of nationality. Some detainees at Guantánamo, for example, spent many years away from their home states prior to capture and were caught in other states fighting for Al Qaeda. Under those circumstances, should an Algerian national who spent extensive time in Bosnia, much of it illegally, be returned to Algeria or Bosnia? Sometimes we could not even identify a target state for return because no state claimed an interest in the detainee in question.

Even when the State Department could identify a state for repatriation, the department was often stymied by concerns the detainee would be mistreated after transfer. While mistreatment of returned detainees is a risk in international armed conflict, it is even more of a risk in conflicts with nonstate groups like Al Qaeda. Many of the Guantánamo detainees were nationals of states with poor human rights records. And suspected members of Al Qaeda were at particular risk because of their home states’ heinous treatment records with respect to suspected Islamic militants, who are often enemies of those states as well.

\(^{177}\) See Peter Baker & Charlie Savage, Terror Attempt May Hinder Plans to Close Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at A14 (describing Senators McCain, Graham, and Lieberman’s effort to use Christmas-day attempt as reason for blocking potential transfer of Guantánamo detainees to Yemen).

Our experience suggests the need for clearer international rules governing repatriation questions in conflicts with nonstate actors. The ICRC has reached the same conclusion.\textsuperscript{179} Unfortunately, the Geneva Conventions provisions dealing with noninternational armed conflict are generally silent on repatriation questions. Common Article 3 and Additional Protocols I and II, all of which have some application in conflicts with nonstate actors, do not provide rules for states regarding repatriation beyond the requirement of release at the cessation of active hostilities, as discussed above. Nor are the treaty provisions governing international armed conflict helpful. Article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention requires that prisoners of war be “repatriated” at the end of hostilities, and offers no alternatives.\textsuperscript{180}

Historically, the absence of IHL rules on repatriation questions has resulted in prisoners being returned to their home countries despite the risk of mistreatment there. After World War II the United States and the United Kingdom entered an agreement with the Soviet Union to repatriate all Soviet citizens.\textsuperscript{181} Soviet prisoners were therefore forcibly repatriated even when they expressed fears of mistreatment. Those fears were justified, as the Soviets treated many returned prisoners brutally; for example, many were sent to forced labor camps in Siberia, and some were even executed.\textsuperscript{182} Nevertheless, states rejected a proposal at the 1949 Geneva Conference that would have given prisoners of war the right to apply for transfer to willing states other than their home states.\textsuperscript{183} States did not want to be legally obligated to accept detained enemy soldiers for resettlement.\textsuperscript{184} They were also concerned that allowing prisoners the right to opt out of repatriation would result in detaining states pressuring prisoners of war to do so.\textsuperscript{185}

Despite the failure to include relevant provisions in the Geneva Conventions themselves, post-Conventions practice suggests that states are now reluctant to repatriate enemy fighters when they face substantial risk of mistreatment. After the Korean War, UN forces, led by the United States, resisted Chinese, North Korean, and Soviet demands that prisoners who feared post-transfer treatment be forcibly repatriated to North Korea; some prisoners were resettled, instead, in South Korea and the United States.\textsuperscript{186} Similar practices followed the Iran-Iraq war

\textsuperscript{179} See Kellenberger, supra note 2 (concluding that “the legal guidance available to detaining authorities [with respect to transfers] is insufficient. There is an immediate need for a set of workable substantive and procedural rules for protecting the integrity and dignity of those [who are transferred from one authority to another].”).

\textsuperscript{180} Article 118 provides: “Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”

\textsuperscript{181} See Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by Forces Operating Under Soviet Command and Forces Operating Under United States of America Command, U.S.-Soviet Union, Art. 1, Feb. 11, 1945 (“All Soviet citizens liberated by the forces operating under United States command . . . will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet . . . authorities . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{182} See DELESSERT, supra note 175, at 151–56 (reporting on Soviet atrocities).

\textsuperscript{183} The Austrian proposal would have given prisoners of war the right “to apply for their transfer to any other country which is ready to accept them.” THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION COMMENTARY, supra note 26, at 542.

\textsuperscript{184} Meron, supra note 43, at 254–55. Meron explains that states were concerned that the logical corollary of a right to opt out of repatriation was a duty to offer asylum on the part of the detaining state, a duty no major state was willing to assume. Id. at 255.

\textsuperscript{185} Such pressure is not unprecedented in modern warfare. See John Quigley, Iran and Iraq and the Obligations to Release and Repatriate Prisoners of War After the Close of Hostilities, 5 AM. U. INT’L L. & POL’Y 73, 81 (1989) (describing ICRC’s concerns that Iran and Iraq were pressuring prisoners to oppose repatriation after their war). States may see a propaganda benefit when enemy state prisoners refuse to return to their home states. See id. (explaining that Iran pressured Iraqi prisoners to demonstrate against Iraq for propaganda purposes).

and the first Gulf war. Likewise, in noninternational armed conflict the United States has adopted a policy not to repatriate detainees when it is more likely than not that the individual will be tortured, although critics accused the Bush administration of failing to observe this policy uniformly.

Current state practice, as described above, evidences a broad consensus that detainees should not be sent to countries where there is reason to believe that they will be tortured or otherwise severely mistreated, though the specific contours of this protection are sometimes disputed. This prohibition is known in international law as the principle of non-refoulement—for which there are three potential sources. First, the Geneva Conventions, including the provisions governing non-international armed conflict, contain a prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. Some IHL experts have found an implied obligation from this prohibition that states not repatriate detainees when they face a substantial risk of mistreatment. While this analysis mirrors the analysis conducted by some human rights bodies as discussed below, other IHL experts have rejected such an implied obligation within the Geneva Conventions.

Second, the Fourth Geneva Convention restricts transfers of protected persons who may be persecuted. Article 45 prohibits the transfer of protected persons “to a country where he or she may have reason to fear persecution for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs.” Of course, as we discussed earlier, Article 45 has limited application in a conflict with a nonstate actor, at least as a matter of treaty law, because nonstate fighters are unlikely to qualify as protected persons. Moreover, the Pictet commentary to Article 45 states that it does not prevent deportation of “aliens in individual cases when state security demands such action.” Presumably, some nonstate fighters, even if deemed protected persons, would fall into this security exception.

187 Meron, supra note 43, at 256.

U.S. policy is not to transfer a person to a country if it is determined that it is more likely than not that the person will be tortured or, in appropriate cases, that the person has a well-founded fear of persecution and would not be disqualified from persecution protection on criminal- or security-related grounds.

See also Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681-761, 822:

It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States.

189 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, STILL AT RISK: DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES NO SAFEGUARD AGAINST TORTURE (2005) (claiming detainees returned from Guantánamo to Russia were mistreated after transfer).

190 For a comprehensive discussion of the treaty and customary international law bases for this norm, see Elijhu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-refoulement: Opinion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 87 (Erika Feller, Volker Türk, & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003).


193 See FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION COMMENTARY, supra note 74, at 266 (explaining that Article 45 does not restrict expulsions of “undesirable foreigners” from state territory).
Third, international human rights law restricts transfers of individuals who will potentially encounter mistreatment. As discussed earlier, the principle of complementarity requires that human rights and IHL obligations be read consistently whenever possible. Given the shared interest in both bodies of law against transfers that would subject persons to mistreatment, application of human rights transfer restrictions to conflicts with nonstate actors is in accordance with the principle of complementarity.194

Human rights law transfer restrictions are found in numerous instruments. Article 33(1) of the Convention Related to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) prohibits states from expelling or returning refugees “where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”195 This obligation is not absolute, as the Refugee Convention contains two important exclusions from protection that relate to security considerations. Article 1(F) exempts from refugee protection individuals who are seriously suspected of having committed war crimes, crimes against the peace, or serious nonpolitical crimes outside the country of refuge.196 And Article 33(2) denies non-refoulement protections to refugees if there are reasonable grounds for regarding the detainee a “danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”

Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (Torture Convention) provides: “No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”197 Unlike the Refugee Convention, the Tor-


196 See id., Art. 1(F):

The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:

(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;

(b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;

(c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

197 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Art. 3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 20-100 (1988), 1465 UNTS 85. In its ratification of the Torture Convention in 1990, the United States entered an understanding stating that it interpreted the phrase “substantial grounds for believing” as “if it is more likely than not.” 136 CONG. REC. 36, 198 (1990) (enacted). The Committee Against Torture has been critical of this understanding. See UN Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: United States of America, para. 40, UN Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006) (recommend-
ture Convention includes no security exclusion. The ICCPR and the European Convention on Human Rights have also been interpreted to include protection, with no exceptions, against transfer to face torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.

Despite the broad consensus on the general principle that detainees should not be transferred when they face torture or other serious mistreatment, certain aspects of the principle of non-refoulement require further legal clarification. Many transfers in conflicts with nonstate actors are undertaken by international forces of nationals present in their home states to their home governments. This issue has arisen repeatedly with respect to transfers of prisoners from allied forces to the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. The United States and the United Kingdom have taken the position that non-refoulement protection does not apply as a matter of law to in-country transfers (although both countries nonetheless seek assurances against torture as a matter of policy). Their position has been driven by practical concerns about what precisely foreign forces are to do, for example, with an Iraqi national detained in Iraq if they are prohibited from returning the person to the Iraqi government. The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits forced transfers of protected persons out of occupied territory “regardless of their motive.”

The Committee Against Torture would apply Article 3 to “in country” transfers, although it has failed to provide practical suggestions on what foreign forces should do with such individuals if they cannot be returned to their home governments. Since it appears that this situation is arising more frequently, clear law is needed on what transfer obligations exist with respect to nationals in their own territories.

It is also unclear what process must be provided to detainees in order to consider their fears of mistreatment upon repatriation. As a general matter, treaty provisions restricting transfers

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198 The United States has interpreted Article 3 of the Torture Convention to apply only to transfers originating from the United States. See United States Written Response to Questions Asked by the Committee Against Torture, at 32 (Apr. 28, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68554.htm (“[T]he United States, while recognizing that some members of the Committee may disagree, believes that Article 3 of the CAT does not impose obligations on the United States with respect to an individual who is outside the territory of the United States.”). Many international organizations and human rights groups, including the Committee Against Torture, disagree with the territorial limitations identified by the United States. See Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantánamo: The Law of International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. Rich. L. Rev. 657, 673 n.65 (2006) (summarizing opposition to U.S. interpretation).


199 See UN Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20: Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment, para. 9, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1992) (“States parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement.”).


201 See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 1, Art. 49 (“Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.”). As discussed earlier, detainees may not be protected persons. Nevertheless, it would remain unclear precisely what an occupying power should do with a detainee if he cannot be returned to the control of his home government.

202 See Gillard, supra note 194, at 712–15 (describing the dispute between the United Kingdom, United States, and Committee Against Torture).
based on fears of mistreatment do not contain explicit procedural requirements for assessing the risk of mistreatment. Article 32(2) of the Refugee Convention is the exception, as it does prohibit states from expelling refugees except through “due process of law,” including the right to submit evidence and be represented during an expulsion proceeding, unless “compelling reasons of national security otherwise require.” A wide range of human rights bodies have indicated non-refoulement has a procedural component, though without specifying what the associated procedural rights would be.203 States faced with repatriating members of nonstate groups need legal guidance on the following questions, among others: Who should be empowered to assess risk of mistreatment? What evidentiary standard should be employed? What evidence is it appropriate for the court to consider? And should the detainee be represented by counsel in such a proceeding.204

These open questions aside, human rights law is generally clear about when states should not transfer detainees; by contrast, it provides no guidance on where states should send detainees if torture considerations prevent repatriation. For example, when a state has a range of options with respect to a particular detainee, is the state free to choose a destination for the detainee, or does the detainee have the right to select his own end destination?205 By contrast, and as human rights advocates acknowledge, some situations present few plausible options for transfer.206

When torture considerations require resettlement of nonstate fighters outside of their home countries, doing so has proven more difficult than after more conventional conflicts. Fighters for nonstate actors may be ideologically committed to the nonstate actor’s cause, creating a security risk for any state that resettles these detainees. In contrast to the willingness of the United States and other countries to resettle Iraqi refugees after the first Gulf war, concern that detainees at Guantánamo may engage in terrorist activity after transfer has prevented third countries, including the United States, from accepting detainees for resettlement. The difficulty in identifying third countries willing to accept Guantánamo detainees for resettlement has slowed the closing of the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay.

When third-country resettlement is not possible, continued detention until a third country is located may not be permitted. Both the U.S. Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis207 and the British House of Lords in A v. Secretary of State208 have struck down efforts to detain aliens

203 See id. at 732–36 (describing jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights, Human Rights Committee, and Committee Against Torture recognizing a procedural element to the non-refoulement right without specifying the content of that right).

204 The D.C. Circuit has held that U.S. federal courts cannot second-guess the executive branch’s determination that a detainee being transferred from Guantánamo Bay will not be tortured after repatriation. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 514–15 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (relying on Supreme Court decision in Munaf v. Geren). Thus, at least for transfers from outside the United States, detainees get no judicial process on the repatriation question.

205 Detainees at Guantánamo Bay have, in many instances, opposed resettlement in their home countries or third countries, sometimes for reasons having nothing to do with fears of mistreatment. See Editorial, The Clock Is Ticking: The White House and Congress Can Still Do Right by the Uighurs, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2009, at A26 (explaining that a Uighur detainee refused to be resettled in Palau because that country refused to accept his brother for resettlement).

206 See Gillard, supra note 194, at 707 (regretting lack of clear answers to the practical problems posed by imposition of non-refoulement protections).


208 See A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56 (holding that indefinite detention of dangerous aliens pending deportation was a disproportionate restriction of European Convention rights).
indefinitely pending deportation, although the U.S. Supreme Court has not answered whether this rule applies to “terrorism or other special circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security.”

Detainees at Guantánamo who have been ordered released but who cannot be resettled have argued that the prohibition on extended detention pending deportation entitles them to resettlement in the United States.

This combination of factors creates a dilemma for states looking to protect their civilian populations from the risks posed by dangerous fighters for nonstate groups. International law generally prohibits states from transferring detainees to their home countries if they will be mistreated after transfer. But alternatives, such as third-country resettlement or continued detention, may not be available as a matter of fact. Further legal development is needed to create tools to allow states simultaneously to terminate detention of nonstate actors, to respect their human rights obligations, and to protect the security of their own populations.

The role of diplomatic assurances needs to be carefully considered as the law continues to develop. These assurances—promises obtained from receiving states that they will not torture or otherwise mistreat detainees—are not used to eliminate fully the risk of post-transfer mistreatment. Rather, the United States and other states have used the assurances to reduce the risk of mistreatment to a sufficient extent that transfer may be conducted consistent with human rights obligations.

Advocates of assurances argue that these bilateral commitments not to mistreat detainees can be effective if the assurances are monitored and penalties or costs imposed for violating them. Indeed, such a bilateral promise to the United States may be harder to violate than an amorphous treaty commitment not to mistreat nationals. Human rights groups have been critical of reliance on diplomatic assurances, however, because they note that states asked to give assurances usually have already violated international commitments not to mistreat their people. These groups ask why these bilateral promises are any more likely to be followed. Their criticisms are bolstered by a small number of highly publicized cases in which states have mistreated returned detainees despite previous assurances to the contrary.

Notwithstanding these highly publicized failures, we believe that diplomatic assurances do have a role in allowing states to meet international legal obligations. The Obama administration agrees, as it recently announced its intention to continue overseas transfers pursuant to an

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209 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 696.
210 See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (describing argument of Chinese national Uighur detainees who claimed right to resettle in the United States). Although the D.C. Circuit rejected this claim, id. at 1028–29, the Supreme Court, 130 S.Ct. 1235 (2010), vacated the decision. On remand, 605 F.3d 1046 (2010), the D.C. Circuit reinstated, with modifications, its earlier holding.
211 For example, Article 3 of the Torture Convention permits transfers in the absence of “substantial grounds” for believing that the individual will be tortured.
213 See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 189 (arguing that mistreatment of Russian detainees after their transfer from Guantánamo Bay demonstrates ineffectiveness of diplomatic assurances).
214 Prominently cited cases of failures of assurances include the deportation of Maher Arar from the United States to Syria and transfers of Guantánamo detainees to Russia and Tunisia. See DEEKS, supra note 212, at 20–21 & n.32 (collating examples of failures of assurances cited by human rights groups).
improved assurances policy.\textsuperscript{215} The current administration appears to have learned from the mistakes made by the Bush administration with respect to assurances and is insisting that the State Department be involved in evaluating all assurances. There is no substitute for the State Department’s diplomatic knowledge in assessing whether the promises made by a foreign government are credible. The Obama administration is also mandating that a meaningful monitoring mechanism always be included.\textsuperscript{216} Our experience in negotiating and implementing assurances suggests that they are most effective when they are accompanied by effective monitoring and a political commitment to carry out the assurances, neither of which has always been present. But obtaining suitable monitoring arrangements, in particular, has been difficult because other states view them as infringing their sovereignty.

In instances in which assurances cannot reduce treatment risks, states may consider releasing the detained persons into their own populations subject to restrictions. International law must consider whether states should be permitted to employ control orders to regulate those released and, if so, what the limitations are on their use. After the House of Lords struck down an antiterrorism law allowing for indefinite detention of alien suspected terrorists pending deportation, the United Kingdom enacted a system of control orders to restrict the movement of suspected terrorists while not in detention facilities.\textsuperscript{217} Under British law, control orders allow the state to impose movement restrictions, electronic surveillance, restrictions on occupation, and curfews on these suspected terrorists in order to mitigate their potential threat.

British courts have interpreted the European Convention on Human Rights as imposing severe restrictions on their use. In \textit{Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF}, the Law Lords relied on an earlier European Court of Human Rights judgment to hold that detainees being subjected to control orders have the right to sufficient information about the reasons for the restrictions so as to be able to challenge the orders.\textsuperscript{218} This requirement has undermined the ability of the British government to impose control orders, because the information in question is often intelligence information that it cannot release to the detainees.\textsuperscript{219} The Law Lords have also held that the European Convention restricts the length of curfews that may be imposed\textsuperscript{220} and the extent to which a detainee may be cut off from friends and family.\textsuperscript{221} As a consequence of these decisions, the control orders left in place have been less stringent than desired and less effective than hoped; some high-profile escapes have occurred.\textsuperscript{222} Given the potential value of control orders as restrictions short of detention that can mitigate threats posed by nonstate actors, further consideration must be given

\textsuperscript{215} U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press Release No. 09-835, supra note 198.
\textsuperscript{216} Id.
\textsuperscript{217} Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c.2 (Eng.).
\textsuperscript{218} See Sec’y of State for the Home Dept. v. AF, [2009] UKHL 28, para. 59 (relying upon European Court of Human Rights judgment in A v. United Kingdom).
\textsuperscript{219} Lord Hoffman explained the “dilemma” that this ruling created for the British government: it could either release information that it believed would compromise national security, or allow a potentially dangerous terrorist to go free without restriction. \textit{Id.}, para. 51.
\textsuperscript{220} See Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45, para. 24 (setting aside an eighteen-hour curfew as a deprivation of liberty contrary to European Convention on Human Rights Article 5).
\textsuperscript{222} See FRESH PERSPECTIVES ON THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ 343 (Miriam Gani & Penelope Mathew eds., 2008) (describing failures of the control-order system); see also Vijay M. Padmanabhan, \textit{Introductory Note to Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights—Treatment of Terrorism Suspects}, 48 ILM 567, 569 (2009) (detailing difficulties that British have faced with use of control orders).
as to whether international law may relax restrictions on imposing these orders while still protecting the rights of persons subject to them.

States also should consider creating an international resettlement mechanism to aid in identifying third-country resettlement options. One constant frustration in the State Department’s efforts to relocate Guantánamo detainees was the department’s inability to involve more effectively the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The UNHCR has a mandate limited to actual refugees, which most former combatants in noninternational armed conflict will not be. A new agency—with a mandate to assist in postconflict resettlement—would be free of that limitation. States would still need to work out a protocol for sharing information with the new agency. Any agency involved in resettling members of nonstate groups would need to share information with the receiving state regarding the threat the resettled individuals may pose. Much of that information may be classified, however, and states have been reluctant to share such information with UN agencies.223 In those cases where Guantánamo detainees may have met the requirements for refugee status, cooperation was stymied by the United States’ refusal to provide classified information to UNHCR.

A final question is whether protection from transfers to face mistreatment should be conceptualized in absolute terms. The ICCPR, Torture Convention, and European Convention on Human Rights have all been interpreted to contain no security exceptions.224 The United Kingdom has repeatedly argued that the European Convention should be interpreted to allow states, in making their repatriation decisions, to balance the security risks posed by the individual against the risk of post-transfer mistreatment.225 Such an approach would be consistent with the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Refugee Convention, which both include exceptions to transfer protections for aliens who pose a security threat to the states where they are currently located. While the European Court of Human Rights has rejected the British suggestion, it seems to us that a balancing approach could potentially take into account the threat posed by nonstate actors and, when non-refoulement protections apply, the dearth of transfer options.

VI. CONCLUSION

Our goal has been to demonstrate the need to develop new international law regarding the detention of persons in conflicts with nonstate actors. Rather than seeking to replace existing international rules, we see the need for new rules where existing rules do not apply or are uncertain in application. Our call for legal development is consistent with the ICRC’s recognition of a “dearth of legal norms” applicable to noninternational armed conflict.226 While IHL does provide important treatment protections for detainees in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, and Additional Protocol II, it fails to provide adequate guidance on many critical legal questions, including the four that we have been focusing on here. An all-too-frequent response to this situation is simply to reiterate that states need to implement existing rules—presumably meaning that states will find answers by applying the

223 See American Service-Members’ Protection Act of 2002, §2006 (mandating that president set up measures to prevent the transfer of classified information to the International Criminal Court for use in investigations, apprehensions, or prosecutions).

224 See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text.

225 See Saadi, supra note 200, para. 122 (summarizing British position).

226 Kellenberger, supra note 2.
law of international armed conflict or international human rights law. But as we have demonstrated, these different bodies of law either have no answers or offer confusing or conflicting answers to many questions. Implementing the existing rules is not enough.

The current gaps in the law concerning detention can be filled in various ways, many of which might be consistent with established law. We see this situation as arguably fortunate and potentially productive because it gives states the legal space required to follow alternative directions in responding to the problems discussed. The laboratory of ideas of the different states, to borrow a term from U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, could generate different potential approaches to answering our questions—approaches that could, over time, generate rich comparisons and ultimately lead to international consensus.

Based on our experience of the international reaction to U.S. policies in the conflict with Al Qaeda, support for such a laboratory of ideas is not shared. Few in the international community have been willing to accept that a range of potential policy options is available on these questions. As noted at the outset of our discussion, a major reason for this reluctance is the fear that this policy freedom may be abused, as it was when the Bush administration exploited holes in the law to advance policies that ran counter to the spirit of the law, if not its letter. That said, the gaps still exist, and if the international community will not support a laboratory-of-ideas approach, the only alternative is for the international community to develop new law to guide policymakers. It is to further that task that we have tried to identify areas of developing consensus that may facilitate further development of the international law on detention.

A critical, threshold question is whether states should embark on the process of drafting a new international treaty to deal with the gaps identified. In 2006, then British Secretary of State for Defence John Reid created a stir when he called for rewriting the Geneva Conventions because of the “risk [in] continuing to fight a 21st century conflict with 20th century rules.”227 The UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee expressed a similar position.228

While we agree with the sentiment behind Reid’s statement, negotiating a new international treaty on these questions is highly unlikely in the near term. Politically, the polarization created by the U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda precludes the possibility that enough states would reach sufficient agreement on these questions to conclude a treaty. Legally, even if states had the political will to conclude an agreement, we are nowhere near having a narrow-enough set of potential answers to the full range of questions that a treaty would address and around which states could coalesce. These problems contributed to the collapse of the ICRC-led “Harvard Process” in 2003, which was designed to address questions of this sort.229

As an interim measure, we suggest that states that are engaged in detention operations in conflicts with nonstate actors intensify efforts to agree on a common set of principles to guide detention. As we noted earlier, past efforts at such a task have been hampered by a reluctance to admit that existing law is inadequate and by disagreements about how any gaps in the law

228 See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM., supra note 5, para. 85 (“We conclude that . . . the Geneva Conventions are failing to provide necessary protection because they lack clarity and are out of date. We recommend that the Government work with other signatories to the Geneva Conventions and with the International Committee of the Red Cross to update the Conventions . . . .”).
may be fixed. If detaining states come to the table committed to developing new rules, the areas of convergence suggested in this article can potentially serve as a useful guide for negotiators.

The time for making progress may actually be at hand. Efforts at reasonable legal dialogue in the years after 9/11 were stymied by passions aroused by the horror of the attacks and also by the Bush administration’s responses to them. A decade later these emotions are beginning to fade, and a new president occupies the White House. Detaining states may be more willing to think openly about the challenges that they face in detaining nonstate actors, and about how the law needs to develop to address those difficulties.

We suggest that states engaged in detention operations involving nonstate actors could potentially work together to begin elaborating a set of new legal rules. The practice of specially affected states is especially important in developing international law because the extent and depth of their experience provides a useful background against which to evaluate possible new rules. The experience of these states would ensure that they come to the table with realistic ideas and possible proposals to address our four questions. And these states may share sufficient interests in common to allow the emergence of principles that generate diplomatic consensus while also being sufficiently specific to provide operational guidance. Rules that are deliberately vague in order to generate broad support are unlikely to provide any further guidance on our four original questions beyond existing law.

If such a process is set in motion, it is essential that these states hear the voices of other groups with stakes in these issues—which would enhance the international legitimacy required for a law-building exercise. For example, the ICRC is a valuable voice that, while appreciating the difficulties and challenges or war, would represent the humanitarian interests of those being detained. The states involved would also be well advised to consult with human rights groups and other states to identify and, insofar as possible, address their areas of concern. If any set of principles that emerges is to serve as the foundation for developing a new treaty in this area, broader participation—and not just by the detaining states—would be needed from the outset.

The continued relevance of international law in governing contemporary conflicts will require that states address, rather than ignore or avoid, the stress that conflicts with nonstate actors exert on existing legal rules. Because of the pressing need to fill the gaps in the existing law of detention, we hope that the relevant actors will acknowledge the limitations of existing law and take effective steps to address them.

230 The International Court of Justice has recognized the importance of “specially affected States” in determining when a practice may amount to customary international law. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G./Den.; F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, 42 (Feb. 20).

231 See Kenneth Anderson, The Role of the United States Military Lawyer in Projecting a Vision of the Laws of War, 4 Chi. J. Int’l L. 445, 448 (2003) (explaining that nongovernmental organizations, unlike affected states, have “no security interest to defend” and are therefore “without any pressure to take the real world into account”).

232 The failure to account for these interests is the cause of instruments like the Ottawa Convention, which regulates landmines, and to which most important war-fighting states are not parties. See id. at 452–53 (noting limited worth of Ottawa Convention because critical states, such as the United States, are not parties).

233 The ICRC recently announced its intent to begin bilateral consultations with states on areas where IHL needs further clarification and development, and to address the subject at the next International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. See Kellenberger, supra note 2. These consultations could play an important role in developing the law in the directions we are suggesting.